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Abstract 
 
This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of the impact of business and financial specific 
regulations on banks in the EU-27 over the 2004-2010 periods. We employ for the first time 
in the banking literature a unique dataset of a wide range of regulation indices from the 
“Doing Business” project of the World Bank. Results for the credit regulation indices show 
that the strength of creditor rights is negatively related to bank performance as measured by 
cost efficiency, although this effect becomes less resilient during the recent crisis period 
(2008-2010). On the other hand, credit information sharing improves performance, a result 
that is further magnified during the crisis. Tax-compliance costs and entry regulation 
constrain bank performance.  More stringent regulation of labour, in terms of minimum wage 
and dismissal costs, and insolvency regulation are positively associated with performance. 
Furthermore, regulation that protects investors from management expropriation, such as the 
extent of director liability, exerts a positive impact on bank performance and more so in the 
crisis years. Finally, we use interaction terms between the business regulation variables and 
institutional quality as measured by the rule of law and corruption. Results show that there 
are cases that institutional quality influences positively or negatively the individual effects of 
specific types of business regulation on bank performance. 
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 1.  Introduction 
Business regulations are central to policy making as setting them right would foster 
competitiveness and boost economic growth, whereas excess regulation could prove harmful 
to the economy. Another important focal point of policy makers is the performance of the 
banking sector, as this is of major significance to the well-functioning of financial markets in 
particular and the economy in general. Moreover, the recent financial crisis demonstrated that 
poor bank performance asserts a negative effect on the overall economy due to the systemic 
financial stability implications and credit constraints. Given the prominence of both 
regulation and bank performance is not surprising that there has been an extensive literature 
(Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache 1998, Barth et al., 2004; Beck et al., 2006; Pasiouras, 2008; 
Pasiouras et al., 2009; Barth et al. 2010; Delis et al., 2011, Delis and Staikouras, 2011)2, in 
particular regarding bank specific regulation. However, to the best of our knowledge the 
impact of wider regulations that could affect the day-to-day bank operations has not been 
examined. To this end, we fill a gap by studying the impact that wider business regulations, 
targeting to improve competitiveness, could have on bank performance, whilst we also focus 
on bank specific regulations.  
In early empirical studies variables that reflect the quality of institutions such as bureaucratic 
quality or law observance serve as proxies for regulation and supervision that is specific to 
the banking sectors. Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998, 2002) provide evidence that 
improved institutional quality is negatively related with the probability of banking crisis and                                                                                                                 
2 Barth (2004) finds that private monitoring regulation has a positive and significant effect on bank performance. 
In the same study official supervisory power and regulation for capital requirements are found not be 
significantly related with the performance of financial institutions. Beck et al. (2006) confirm the importance of 
private monitoring regulation for the banking sector. In a study of 2,500 banks across 37 countries they find that 
enhancing private monitoring of banks by obliging them to reveal truthful information to the private sector has 
as a result to decrease the level to which corruption of bank staff posits a hurdle for companies to access finance. 
In another study, Pasiouras et al. (2009) investigate the impact of the three pillars of Basel II and restrictions on 
bank activities on efficiency. They find that market discipline regulation and the supervisory authority is 
positively related with bank efficiency. On the other hand, restrictions on bank activities increase profit 
efficiency but reduce cost efficiency, while stricter capital requirements have the reverse impact. Other studies 
that examine the impact of financial regulation on bank performance include Pasiouras (2008), Barth et al. 
(2010), Delis et al. (2011), Delis and Staikouras, (2011). 
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reduces the effect of moral hazard due to deposit insurance regulation. The availability of 
data for regulation specific to the banking sector steered research that use these data as main 
regulatory variables while general country-level institutional quality measures serve as 
control variables. A proliferation of research that examines the impact of bank supervision 
and regulation on bank performance has not reached yet an agreement on how specific types 
of bank regulation affect bank performance or what in general is a good regulation for the 
financial sector. 
Furthermore, extant research of the impact of non-financial regulation on bank performance 
is limited although banks operate within the wide spectrum of regulations of the country they 
are located. This is so despite that some studies have demonstrated the importance of non-
financial institutional and regulatory framework in explaining cross-country differences in 
bank performance (Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 2004, 2008; Lensink et al. 2008; Hasan et al. 2009). 
Overall, the literature that links regulation to bank performance is dominated by bank-
specific regulation, while institutional quality measures serve as control variables. 
Furthermore, the limited literature that focuses specifically on how non-financial regulation 
and institutional quality could affect bank performance uses wide measures, as for example 
law observance, making it harder to derive specific policy implications in order to prioritise 
efforts to improve the regulatory framework.   
In the light of the above, this paper provides a missing link by examining a wide range of 
bank but also country-specific regulation on performance. Firstly, we examine in both fixed 
effects and dynamic panel models how several types of business regulation derived from the 
“Doing Business” project of the World Bank affect bank performance (as measured by 
efficiency) in the EU-27 economies over the 2004-2010 period. In particular we employ 
models that account for business regulation in the following categories: starting a business; 
getting credit; protecting investors; enforcing contracts; paying taxes; resolving insolvency 
and employing workers. Secondly, we investigate the extent to which the impact of each type 
of regulation is conditional on institutional quality measures such as the rule of law and 
control of corruption. Finally, as sensitivity analysis, we examine for the existence of any 
potential heterogeneity in the impact of credit regulation and protecting investors regulation 
on bank performance during the crisis. 
Although we examine several (seven) types of business regulation we place emphasis on 
credit regulation as is directly linked with the banking sector and of some importance for 
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financial stability. Also, for the first time in the banking literature we investigate the impact 
of entry and tax regulation on performance, both making the top of the agenda of EU’s policy 
makers as they perceived to improve competitiveness and hence expedite the recovery from 
the recent financial and sovereign debt crisis. A first glimpse at the results reveal that there is 
not one size fits all effect of regulation on performance. The observed variability is of interest 
for policy making as it highlights where one could focus to boost bank performance and thus 
financial stability. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the data 
and the underlying methodology, Section 3 reports and discusses the results, whilst  the final 
section offers some concluding comments related to policy making.  
2.  Data and Variables 
2.1 Measuring Bank Performance with Cost Efficiency 
We use data from IBCA-Bankscope for the 2004-2010 period. The sample includes 2046 
commercial and savings banks and, after removing errors and inconsistencies, 11,421 
bank/year observations remain in an unbalanced panel.  The sample includes the majority of 
such banks in the EU-27 economies.   
In this study we measure bank performance in terms of cost efficiency. To this end we opt for 
the stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) and follow the Battese and Coelli (1995) methodology 
in order to estimate bank cost efficiency.3 The Battese and Coelli (1995) model is suitable for 
panel data and allows controlling for country-level environmental differences in a single 
stage estimation.  The  Battese and Coelli (1995) cost SFA model takes the form:  
 
                                 TCi,t = f (Pi,t, Yi,t, Ni,t,  Zk,t) + vi,t + ui,t 
                                                                                           (1)                                                                                                                            
, where TCi,t  the total cost for firm (bank) i at year t, Pit is a vector of input prices Yi,t is a 
vector of outputs of the firm, Ni,t a vector of fixed netputs while  Zk,t is a vector of country-
specific environmental variables. vi,t  represents random errors that are assumed to be i.i.d. 
                                                                                                                3   An advantage of the SFA methodology is that both random error and inefficiency are incorporated in a 
composite error term.       
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and  have N(0,!!2) while ui,t  represents non-negative inefficiency effects that are assumed to 
be  independently but not identically distributed.  
Moreover, we employ a flexible translog cost specification: 
!"!"!,! = !! + !!!"!!,! + !!!"#!,! + 1 2 !!"!"#!,!!"#!,! + 1 2 !!"!"#!,!!"#!,! +!!!!!!  + !!"!"#!,!!"#!,! + !!!"#!,! + 1 2 !!"!"#!,!!"#!,! + 1 2 !!"!"#!,!!"#!,! +!!!!!!!  + !!"!"#!,!!"#!,! + !!! + 1 2 !!!! + !!!!"#!,!! + !!!!"#!,! + !!!!"#!,! +!!!!  + !!!!,! + !!,! ± !!,!!                                                                  (2)                                                          
In the quadratic terms of the stochastic frontier model (2) we impose standard linear 
homogeneity and symmetry restrictions. We estimate (2) using maximum likelihood method 
parameterized in terms of the variance parameters 2tεσ =
2
utσ  +
2
vtσ and γ = 
2
utσ /
2
tεσ .  
In order to define bank inputs and outputs we follow Sealey and Lindley (1977) and opt for 
the intermediation approach. This approach assumes that the main function of banks is to use 
labour and capital in order to collect funds with the scope of transforming them into loans and 
other income generating assets. More specifically, two inputs and two outputs are specified. 
Inputs include labour, as measured by personnel expenses, and financial capital, while loans, 
net of provisions and other earning assets, government securities, bonds, equity investments, 
CDs and T-bills, are the outputs. 
In terms of the input prices, we calculate the price of the financial capital as the ratio of total 
interest expenses to total interest bearing borrowed funds while the price of labour is 
represented with the ratio of personnel expenses to total assets. The sum of overheads, such 
as personnel and administrative expenses, interest, fee and commission expenses, represents 
the total cost of each bank in the sample. 
Furthermore, we include equity as a quasi-fixed netput. The reason for this is twofold: firstly, 
equity represents an alternative source of funding for a bank. In this way, the level of equity 
of each bank has the potential to affect directly its cost structure (Berger and Mester, 1997).  
In addition to this, ignoring financial capital may lead to a biased estimation of efficiency as 
banks with higher equity capital, which denotes that the shareholders have more capital at 
stake, may behave in a more risk averse manner than banks with lower level of equity but still 
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optimally given the risk preferences of their shareholders. Additionally, we include each 
bank’s level of fixed assets, as a proxy for physical capital, which is also a standard in the 
literature related to efficiency estimation (Berger and Mester, 1997). 
 
Finally, for environmental variables (Zk,t) we take account of GDP growth and inflation as 
proxies for the dynamism and the macroeconomic stability of each country. To control for the 
level of concentration in the banking industry, we use the assets of the five largest banks as a 
share of assets of all commercial banks (the C5 ratio), while to capture heterogeneity in bank 
competition we employ the Lerner index at the country level.4  
2.2 Business Regulations 
 
Once we obtain the efficiency scores for each bank i for each year t we provide second stage 
regressions analysis with a wide range of World Bank business regulation indexes along with 
several control variables.5 We opt for seven categories of business regulation available by the 
“Doing Business” project of the World Bank. Each of these broad categories is composed of 
different indices that measure a specific aspect of regulation rigidity faced by firms operating 
in a specific country. Namely we include in our models regulation related to the following 
categories.  
                                                                                                                
4 The Lerner index is a measure of market power in the banking market. It is defined as the difference between 
output prices and marginal costs. In this study the Lerner index at the country level is used. This is calculated 
with the following formula: Lerneri,t = (PTAi,t – MCTAi,t) / PTAi,t, where PTAi,t is the price of total assets of the 
banks in a country proxied by the ratio of total bank revenues to total bank assets for country i at time t, and 
MCTAi,t is the marginal cost of the total assets of the banking system for country  i at time t. Higher values of 
the Lerner index indicate less bank competition. The source is the Global Financial Development Database of 
the World Bank (Cihak et al., 2012). 
5 A number of control variables are used to account for individual bank characteristics:  total assets (TA) 
represent the size of each bank. Bank size might have a positive impact on bank performance as it may indicate 
higher diversification (Mester, 1993). On the other hand bank size can affect negatively performance if 
economies of scale and scope are not realised. The extant empirical evidence on the impact of size on bank 
efficiency is mixed (see for example Altunbas et al., 2001; Carbo et al., 2002; Bikker, 2002; Maudos and De 
Guevara, 2007). We also include the ratio of loans to assets (LA), which represents well-functioning 
intermediation by the bank.  Similarly, the equity to assets ratio (EA) and the return on equity (ROE) are 
employed as control variables as they represent increased motivation from the part of shareholders to monitor 
management and increased capacity to generate value for the shareholder. Furthermore, we include the loan loss 
provisions to total loans (LLPL) as a measure the quality of the credit portfolio and a proxy for risk. The 
relationship between risk and performance could be either negative, according to the “bad management” and the 
“bad luck” hypothesis, or positive, according to the “skimping hypothesis”  (Berger and DeYoung, 1997). In 
terms of the country-level control variables, we opt for the domestic credit to the private sector as a share of 
GDP (DCP) in order to account for the level of financial development. Moreover, to control for the general level 
of economic development we use real GDP per capita (GDPcap) in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms.  
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• Starting a business: This category includes both bureaucratic and cost related indices 
that pose hurdles to entrepreneurship in each country. 
• Getting credit: Two kinds of credit regulation are included here. The strength of 
creditor rights such as the collateral efficacy and the availability as well as the quality 
(depth) of the credit information registries.  
• Paying taxes: Regulation related to procedural related tax regulation as well as the 
level of corporate profit taxation is included in this category.  
• Enforcing contracts: This topic measures bureaucracy as well as cost related 
regulation regarding the efficiency of contract enforcement at the country level. 
• Resolving insolvency: Procedural and cost related measures are also included in this 
type of business regulation, which accounts for country-level bankruptcy legislation. 
• Protecting investors:  This category of business regulation includes measures related 
to firm transparency as measured by disclosure regulation as well as measures that 
rate how well the interests of shareholders are protected against management 
exploitation of firms for personal benefit.  
• Employing workers: Labour regulation measures are included in this index. They are 
related with the cost of labour (minimum wage) and dismissal costs regulation. 
 
A major advantage of the “Doing Business” indices in comparison with other indices that try 
to rate country-level business environment, as for example the widely used economic 
freedom indices, is that each category of regulation is highly decomposed enabling to spot 
specific areas of business regulation that could affect bank performance. This could support 
the prioritisation of reform efforts in a more focused manner.  
Note that the credit regulation index is composed of the level of creditor rights protection, the 
depth of credit information and the existence and coverage of private and public credit 
information registries. Creditor rights can influence the behaviour of corporate borrowers as 
they could reduce risk-taking activities (Acharya et al., 2011) which, in turn, could improve 
bank’s credit risk. Qian and Strahan (2007) find that protection of creditor rights is associated 
with greater concentration of loan ownership, longer-term lending, and lower interest rates6. 
Thus, strong creditor rights could be positively associated with bank performance through 
lower operational costs and lower credit risk exposure. On the other hand, stronger creditor                                                                                                                 6  It could be argued then that strong creditor rights could reduce banks’ operational costs through economies of 
scale in lending, lower loan screening costs, as the monitoring of loans becomes less frequent and lower loan 
default probabilities because of lower loan rates.  
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rights may reduce the incentive of bank managers to carefully screen loans (Manove et al. 
2001; Zazzaro, 2005).7 Credit information sharing, through the existence and the coverage of 
credit registries, as well as the depth of credit information available, can be a factor of 
improved bank performance via the reduction of adverse selection and moral hazard in loan 
origination (Pagano and Jappelli, 1993; Kalberg and Udell, 2003)8.   
A type of regulation that EU pays particular attention is the starting a business regulation.  
EU economies seem to lag behind in terms of total factor productivity (TFP) in comparison 
with the US. Tackling this issue appears at the top of political agenda of the EU Commission 
(see for example the Lisbon Agenda).  Recent research has provided evidence that entry 
regulation could explain TFP differences between EU and the US  (see Poschke, 2010). 
Business regulations and bureaucratic procedures that restrain business entry and reduce 
competition may impede bank performance because of a negative impact on the performance 
of the firms located in a country and the fulfilment of their obligations (loans) to the banking 
sector. In particular regulatory entry barriers can lead to decreased competition through a 
reduction in new firms entering an industry (Klapper et al. 2006; Ciccone and Papaioannou, 
2007). This decreased competitive pressure can lead to lower investment (Alesina et al. 
2005), reduced growth (Loyaza et al. 2006) and less productivity (Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 
2003; Bastos and Nasir, 2004; Bourlès et al., 2010).   In addition, the financial crisis of 2008 
and thereafter the sovereign debt crisis has further highlighted the importance of enhancing 
competitiveness through structural reforms that also encompass facilitating entry, as certain 
euro-area countries, i.e. Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, struggle.  The examination of the 
link between entry regulation and bank performance in the EU economies is a timely and 
relevant issue. 
Another important regulation that has not been investigated in detail in terms of its link to 
bank performance refers to tax regulation, also in light of the recent austerity throughout the 
EU. The literature that relates explicit and implicit taxation on the banking sector finds a 
pass-through effect from the banking sector to bank’s customers (Demirgüç-Kunt and                                                                                                                 
7 Manove et al. (2001) show that the use of collateral in the process of loan origination could lead to significant 
decrease in screening efforts and as a consequence make banks to provide credit to a high number of worthless 
projects. Zazzaro (2005) finds a more careful screening by managers of banking operations such as loan 
origination when high costs are associated with such contractual agreements.    8  Padilla and Pagano (1997) show that credit information sharing enhances the discipline of borrowers and 
reduces moral hazard as in Vercammen (1995) and Padilla and Pagano (2000). Furthermore, Klein (1992) shows 
that increased credit information sharing at the presence of weak creditor rights can enforce loan repayment by 
borrowers. This is because borrowers would try to avoid being black listed and as a result excluded from future 
bank financing. 
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Huizinga, 1999; Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2001; Albertazzi and Gambacorta ,2010; 
Chiorazzo and Milani, 2011). This pass-through effect might have a direct effect on bank 
credit risk and thus performance, as increased loan interest rates might lead to an increase of 
non-performing loans. Through another channel, raising taxation does little to boost growth 
as it acts as disincentive to investment growth (Arnold, 2008; Schwellnus and Arnold, 2008; 
Vartia, 2008; Arnold et al., 2011). In turn, lower firm growth would also have adverse 
implications on the banking industry.  
2.3  The Interaction of Regulations and Institutional Quality  
 
An interesting question that arises is whether the effects of different types of business 
regulation on bank performance differ according to the level of institutional quality of each 
country. To explore this issue we interact business regulations with the rule of law (RL-WB) 
variable that serves as a proxy of the country-level legislation implementation capacity, but 
also the degree of compliance.9 It might be the case that in the presence of low level of law 
observance a specific regulation maybe in place but at the same time it might not be followed 
by the economic agents. Interacting the rule of law (RL-WB) variable with the different types 
of business regulation enables us to identify if the individual effect of each type of business 
regulation on bank performance is more subdued when the law might exist on paper but less 
implemented in practice.  
Moreover, we also take into account corruption by interacting the control of corruption 
(COR-WB) variable with the regulation variables so as to investigate the “grease the wheel” 
or the “sand the wheels’’ hypotheses. The “grease the wheel” hypothesis denotes that higher 
levels of corruption may speed up bureaucratic processes (see, for example Lui, 1985) and 
could thus increase firm operational efficiency while the “sand the wheels’’ hypothesis 
contends that higher levels of corruption represent an additional cost when dealing with 
public sector bureaucracy (Murphy et al., 1993) and so further impede operational efficiency. 
Negative (positive) and significant coefficients for the interaction terms would suggest that 
the negative (positive) individual impact of a specific business regulation on bank 
performance would be less (more) pronounced in the presence of higher institutional quality. 
                                                                                                                9  The use of interaction terms between institutional development indices, such as measures of rule of law, and 
regulation is common in the banking and finance literature. For example Cull et al. (2002) find that in weak 
regulatory environments, explicit deposit insurance schemes are related to declines in financial depth. In another 
study Beck et al. (2004) find that the negative relationship between bank concentration and financing obstacles 
is diminished in countries with higher institutional quality.  
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Both of the institutional quality measures, rule of law (RL-WB) and control of corruption 
(COR-WB) are sourced from the World Governance Indicators of the World Bank.   
3.  Results and Discussion 
3.1 Bank Performance Estimates (Cost Efficiencies) 
 
(Insert Table 1 about here) 
Cost efficiency scores are reported in Table 1, showing the average score over the period 
2004-201010. The average bank cost efficiency for the sample is 0.834, a figure that conforms 
with previous studies for the EU (Koutsomanoli-Filippaki and Mamatzakis, 2009; Weill 
2009; Casu and Girardone, 2010). It is worth noting that despite increased levels of financial 
integration between the old member states (EU-15) and the new member states (EU-10) 
significant differences in terms of bank efficiency still persist. For example the efficiency 
scores for Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria are significantly behind the average efficiency 
score for the EU-27. In terms of the time series, there is a significant drop of efficiency in 
2008.  This is not coincidental as 2008 represents the peak of the financial crisis. Bank 
performance in the EU-27 economies seems to bounce back during 2009 and 2010. 
 
3.2  The Impact of the Control Variables 
 
 
Before proceeding in the analysing the impact of different types of business regulation on 
bank performance we provide an overview of the results of bank-specific, macroeconomic 
and financial structure variables (see Tables 2-24). The intermediation ratio (LA), bank size 
(lnTA),  the equity to assets ratio (EA) and the profitability ratio (ROE)  exert a positive 
impact on bank performance in line with previous studies (Miller and Noulas, 1996; Isik and 
Hasan, 2003; Casu and Girardone, 2004; Rao, 2005). On the other hand, the net interest                                                                                                                 
10 Regarding the translog cost function using the Battese and Coelli (1995) model refer to table A1 in the 
appendix. The results for the environmental (Z) variables show that the inflation rate (INFL) has a positive 
impact on inefficiency while GDP growth (GDPgr) exerts a negative effect on inefficiency in line with Yildirim 
and Philippatos (2007). The concentration ratio (C5) has a negative effect on inefficiency in line with Lensink et 
al. (2008). Furthermore, the Lerner index at the country level has negative effect on inefficiency giving 
supporting the “competition-fragility” hypothesis (Berger et al., 2008) according to which higher competition 
can lead to a deterioration in the quality of bank loans (Jimenez et al., 2007) and higher risk (Keeley, 1990). 
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margin (NIM) exerts a negative impact on performance lending support to the view that 
banks pass inefficiencies to consumers using higher interest rates. Furthermore, the loan loss 
provision to total loans ratio (LLPL) is positively associated with performance. Such finding 
resembles the “skimping” hypothesis (Berger and DeYoung; 1997), according to which banks 
that put less effort on loan screening could be more cost efficient in short time periods. 
Finally, in terms of the macroeconomic and financial structure control variables, we find that 
the general level of economic development (lnGDPcap) and the level of financial 
development (DCP) are negatively related with bank performance. The negative impact of 
the general level of economic development (lnGDPcap) on bank performance could indicate 
the higher operating and financial costs for supplying a given level of services in richer 
markets. (Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas, 2000).  
 
3.3 The Impact of Business Regulations 
 
3.3.1 Starting a business 
Tables 2 and 3 report the fixed effects and dynamic panel11 results for the Starting a Business 
category respectively. The starting a business category of business regulations accounts for 
the following indices: i) entry procedures, ii) entry time, iii) entry cost and iv) entry minimum 
capital. 
 
(Insert Table 2 and 3 about here) 
The fixed effects results reveal that all the four indices that capture the effect of hurdles to 
start a new business are negatively related with efficiency (see models 1 to 4 of Table 2) 
while three of them are statistically significant. In particular, the entry time (lnDAYS-SB) is 
statistically significant at the 5% level, while the entry cost (COST-SB) and entry minimum 
capital (MINCAP-SB) variables are significant at the 1% level. All indices are negatively 
related with efficiency. Following a specific to general specification in our empirical 
estimations we run a regression that includes all the starting a business indices (see model 5 
of Table 2).  In the fixed effects model the entry cost (COST-SB) and entry minimum capital                                                                                                                 11  In all the dynamic panel models in this study we use the two-step system GMM  (Arellano and Bover, 1995) 
specification with Windmeijer-corrected (robust) standard errors.	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(MINCAP-SB) variables retain their statistical significance at the 1% and 5% levels 
respectively while the entry time variable (lnDAYS-SB) becomes insignificant. The dynamic 
panel results in Table 3 further confirm the fixed effects results as far concerns the entry cost 
(COST-SB) and entry minimum capital (MINCAP-SB) variables  (see models 3, 4 and 5 of 
Table 3). It is evident that the financial obstacles in starting a business, rather than the 
procedural ones, matter negatively for bank performance. A potential channel through which 
financial obstacles in starting a business can impede bank performance is because of reduced 
performance of existing firms in a country (Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2003; Alesina et al. 2005; 
Klapper, 2006; Bourlès et al., 2010)  because of  lower levels of competition (Klapper et al. 
2006; Ciccone and Papaioannou, 2007).  This reduced firm performance could negatively 
affect the fulfilment of the obligations these firms have to the banking sector (loans).  
Moreover, adding red tape in terms of starting business is found to induce informality 
(Loyaza et al. 2006) so making it harder and more costly for banks to evaluate the 
creditworthiness of a firm (Hoff and Stiglitz, 1993; Besley, 1995). Another channel through 
which starting a business regulation could have a negative impact on bank performance is 
because it could reduce the innovation efforts of firms (Amable et al. 2009; Barbosa and 
Faria, 2011). This decreased innovation effort could affect negatively firm profitability 
(Leiponen, 2000; Cefis and Ciccarelli, 2005, Cozza et al. 2012) which in turn could impair 
the performance of the banking sector because of increased loan defaults.  Lastly, the 
interaction terms between starting a business regulation and institutional quality are not 
significant as the results in Table 4 demonstrate. 
(Insert Table 4 about here) 
3.3.2 Getting credit 
Tables 5 and 6 present results of the fixed effects and the dynamic models respectively for 
business regulation related to getting credit. This category of business regulations includes 
the following indices: i) legal rights of creditors ii) credit information depth, iii) public credit 
registry coverage and iv)private credit registry coverage. 
 
(Insert Tables 5 and 6 about here) 
An interesting result emerges as strengthening the protection of creditor rights (LEG-CG) 
would reduce performance in both the fixed effects and the dynamic panel specifications (see 
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model 1 in Table 5 and model 1 in Table 6).  This result would imply that strong creditor 
rights do little to motivate bank managers to actively engage in screening loans in line with 
the empirical findings of Manove et al. (2001) and Zazzaro (2005). Furthermore, low levels 
of creditor rights induce banks to originate loans with shorter maturities in order for banks to 
be able to stop lending when the deterioration in the creditworthiness of a borrower becomes 
evident (Diamond, 2004). Borrowers of loans with short maturities are screened more often 
when they apply for refinancing. Although more frequent screening of borrowers represents a 
cost for banks it could be the case that the benefits in terms of the quality of a bank’s credit 
portfolio because of more frequent monitoring outweigh such costs.  
On the other hand, the depth of credit information (DEPTH-LEG) has a positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% level impact on bank performance in both the fixed effects 
(see model 2 in Table 5) and dynamic specifications (see models 2 and 5 in Table 6). 
Moreover, the impact of the private sector credit registry coverage (PR-CG) is positively 
related to bank performance at the 1% level in the fixed effects specification (see models 4 
and 5 in Table 5). The results related to positive impact of the private sector credit registry 
coverage (PR-CG) on efficiency lends support to the view that credit information sharing can 
promote bank performance through increased discipline of borrowers (Klein, 1992; 
Vercammen, 1995; Pagano, 1997; Padilla and Pagano, 2000). Along these lines, Houston et 
al. (2010) find that increased credit information sharing at the country-level increases bank 
profitability, lowers bank risk but also decreases the likelihood of financial crisis and 
increases economic growth. Furthermore, credit information sharing improvements may 
contribute to the reduction of the significant informational disadvantages foreign and new 
entrant banks have in a market (Bofondi and Gobbi, 2006; Gianneti and Ongena, 2009), 
improving in that way their performance.  
The positive and significant impact of the credit information depth (DEPTH-LEG) underlines 
the importance of credit registries and of information regarding the underlying quality. 
Similarly, the negative impact, at the 10% significance level, of the public registry coverage 
(PB-CG) on bank performance in the dynamic analysis (see model 5 of Table 6) could reflect 
that, in general, public credit registries have relatively lower quality compared to private 
ones.  
(Insert Table 7 about here) 
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The interaction terms between the getting credit variables and the institutional quality as 
measured by the rule of law (RL-WB) and the control of corruption variables (COR-WB) 
reveal the complexities associated with this category of regulation. In particular, in model 2 
of Table 7 the interaction term between the credit information depth (DEPTH-CG) and the 
rule of law (RL-WB) is negative and statistically significant at the 10% level while the 
individual effect of the credit information depth (DEPTH-CG) is positive and significant at 
the 1% level. The positive individual effect of the credit information depth on bank 
performance seems to become more subdued when higher levels of rule of law (RL-WB) 
prevail. Similarly, in model 4 of Table 7 the interaction between the private sector credit 
registry coverage (PV-CG) and the rule of law (RL-WB) is negative and significant at the 
10% level while the individual effect of the private sector credit registry coverage (PV-CG) is 
positive and significant at the 1% level.  This can be justified by increased confidence and 
reliance on hard (purely financial) information in the presence of higher rule of law (RL-WB) 
while at the same time banks could ignore critical soft (relationship type) information that 
could improve the lending decision (Petersen and Rajan, 1995; Stein 2002). An alternative 
explanation could be that the marginal informational benefit for banks derived from credit 
information depth (DEPTH-CG) and the private sector credit registry coverage (PV-CG) is 
higher at lower levels of rule of law (RL-WB) where contract obligations such as loans are 
comparatively less respected (Klein, 1992). Finally, an interesting finding is the positive and 
significant, at the 10% level, impact on bank performance of the interaction term between 
control of corruption (COR-WB) and the public credit registry coverage variable (PB-CG) 
when the individual effect of the public credit registry coverage (PB-CG) is negative and 
significant at the 10% level (see model 7 of Table 7). This finding suggests that reliance of 
banks on public credit registries is beneficial in terms of performance in case of low levels of 
corruption where information of public registries might become more reliable. 
3.3.3 Paying taxes 
The paying taxes category of regulations accounts for the following indices: i) number of tax 
payments per year, ii) time dedicated at the firm level in order to handle taxation regulation 
and iii) profit tax. 
(Insert Tables 8 and 9 about here) 
The results indicate that taxation regulation asserts a negative impact on bank performance. 
In particular the number of tax payments per year (lnTAX-NUM) negatively affects bank 
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performance in both the fixed effects and dynamic specifications (see models 1 and 4 of 
Table 8 and Table 9). In the dynamic analysis (see models 2 and 3 of Table 9) sub-taxation 
regulation indices such as tax hours (lnTAX-HOURS) and profit taxation (TAX-PRO) are 
negatively associated with bank performance at the 1% and 5% levels respectively.   
The finding that bureaucracy related taxation indices (see lnTAX-NUM and lnTAX-HOURS) 
have negative effect on bank performance could be explained by increased levels of firm 
informality due to the stringency of such regulation (La Porta and Shleifer, 2008). This 
increased informality would make it harder and more costly for banks to assess the credit 
worthiness of a firm (Hoff and Stiglitz, 1993; Besley, 1995). Furthermore, there is evidence 
that lower levels of firm formality, as measured by tax compliance, is associated with lower 
firm profitability and higher risk (Fajnzylber et al., 2006) that could increase loan defaults. 
Another channel trough which stringent taxation regulation can negatively affect bank 
performance would be the reduction of investment and entrepreneurial activity in the 
economy (Djankov et al., 2010, Da Rin et al., 2011). 
Additionally, the tentative evidence that profit taxation (TAX-PRO) is negatively associated 
with bank performance (see model 3 in Table 9) would suggest that increasing the taxation 
burden induces higher levels of loan defaults because of the pass-through effect from banks 
to borrowers (Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999; Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2001; 
Albertazzi and Gambacorta , 2010; Chiorazzo and Milani, 2011) and the reduction of the 
performance of the non-financial firms because of less capital investment (Arnold, 2008; 
Schwellnus and Arnold, 2008; Vartia, 2008; Arnold et al., 2011). 
Turning into the interaction terms between taxation regulation and the rule of law (RL-WB) 
and the control of corruption (COR-WB) it is revealed that the impact of some types of tax 
regulation on bank performance depends on institutional quality.  
(Insert Table 10 about here) 
In model 1 of Table 10 the interaction term between rule of law (RL-WB) and the number of 
tax payments per year (TAX-NUM) asserts a positive and significant, at the 1% level, impact 
on bank performance, whilst the individual effect of the TAX-NUM variable is negative and 
significant at the 1% level. At higher levels of rule of law, one of the channels through which 
tax regulation can affect negatively bank performance, namely the  higher level of firm 
informality (La Porta and Shleifer, 2008) which could increase the cost of financial 
intermediation (Hoff and Stiglitz, 1993; Besley, 1995) , may become  restrained. This is 
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because rule of law and judicial efficiency are able to decrease the level of the unofficial 
economy (Loayaza, 1996; Johnson et al., 1998; Friedman et al., 2000).  Finally, the 
interaction term between the control of corruption variable (COR-WB) and tax hours 
(lnTAX-HOURS) (see model 5 of Table 10) positively and significantly at the 5% level 
affects performance, whilst the individual effect of the lnTAX-HOURS variable is negative at 
the 1% level. This result conforms with the “sand the wheels” (Murphy et al., 1993) 
hypothesis according to which higher levels of corruption impose additional costs to 
economic agents. In this context, the negative interaction between the control of corruption 
variable (COR-WB) and the number of tax hours (lnTAX-HOURS) could indicate that the 
lower level of additional costs that are incurred by firms in form of corruption when they deal 
with tax payments may be a factor contributing to the free up of capital available for firms to 
fulfil their obligations (loans) to the banking sector.  
3.3.4 Enforcing contracts 
Moving to the enforcing contracts category of regulations the econometric results are 
presented in Tables 11 and 12. This category accounts for the following indices: i) contracts 
time, ii) contracts cost and iii) contract procedures. 
 
(Insert Tables 11 and 12 about here) 
None of the enforcing contracts variables has a statistically significant impact on bank 
performance in the fixed effects specification (see Table 11). On the other hand, the dynamic 
panel analysis reveals that the cost of contract enforcement (COST-CON) is positively related 
to performance at the 5% level (see model 2 of Table 12).  This finding is in line with the 
negative association of the strength of creditor rights with bank performance discussed in 
section 3.3.2 In more detail, when the enforcement of contracts and in effect of loans is 
costly, bank managers may engage in more careful screening in the loan origination process 
(Manove et al., 2001; Zazzaro, 2005) improving in that way the quality of the bank’s loan 
portfolio. The contract procedures variable (lnPRO-CON), on the other hand, has a negative 
and statistically significant impact at the 1% level on performance while this result, unlike the 
one of the contract costs (COST-CON) variable, remains robust in the fourth model of Table 
12 where the rest of the enforcing contracts regulation variables are accounted for.  
(Insert Table 13 about here) 
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Table 13 presents a positive and significant effect of the interaction between contract 
procedures (lnPRO-CON) and the rule of law (RL-WB) (see model 3 of Table 13). Note that, 
the individual effect of the contract procedures (lnPRO-CON) on bank performance is 
negative at the 1% level. The combination of the above results imply that the negative impact 
of contract procedures on bank performance becomes restrained in the presence of higher 
levels of law observance that may act as block for further delays (Ashan, 2013). Finally, in 
model 6 of Table 13 the effect of contract procedures (lnPRO-CON) on bank performance 
remains negative at the 1% as the coefficient of its interaction with the control of corruption 
variable (COR-WB), providing evidence in accordance with the “grease the wheel” 
hypothesis (Lui, 1985) of corruption. 
3.3.5 Protecting investors 
The protecting investors category accounts for the following indices: i) extent of disclosure, 
ii) extent of director liability and iii) ease of shareholder suits. Regulation related to the 
protection of investors appears to be an important determinant of bank performance (see 
Table 14 and Table 15).  
(Insert Tables 14  and 15 about here) 
The fixed effect results show that the extent of director liability (LIA-PI) and ease of 
shareholder suits  (SUI-PI) have a significant, at the 1% level, and positive impact on bank 
performance (see models 2, 3 and 4 of Table 14). The dynamic panel analysis confirms these 
results for the extent of director liability (LIA-PI) variable (see models 2 and 4 of Table 15). 
Legislation that protects the interests of investors from director misconduct has a beneficial 
effect on the banking sector in terms of efficiency. This result is in line with previous studies 
that confirm that managers operating in countries with strong investor protection legislation 
are less likely to use firm resources for their own benefit at the expense of shareholders while 
they tend to invest in projects with higher potential benefit the shareholders (Wurgler, 2000; 
Shleifer and Wolfenzon, 2002; Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad, 2010). A surprising result is 
that the extent of disclosure variable (DISC-PI) is negatively associated with bank 
performance in the fixed effects specification (see models 1 and 4 of Table 14). Disclosure 
regulations can raise the cost structure of a firm not only because of the direct expenses 
related to such legislation, as for example meeting stricter accounts regulation, but also 
through magnifying or even creating new agency problems (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2012). 
Finally, the interactions between protecting investor regulation and the rule of law (RL-WB) 
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and the control of corruption (COR-WB) in Table 16 show that the impact of protecting 
investors regulation on bank performance is not dependent on institutional quality. 
 
(Insert Table 16  about here) 
 
3.3.6  Resolving Insolvency 
This category accounts for the following indices: i) insolvency time, ii) insolvency cost and 
iii) insolvency recovery rate. 
 
 (Insert Tables 17 and 18 about here) 
All the resolving insolvency variables appear to have a positive and statistically significant 
impact on bank performance in the fixed effect models (see models 1, 2 and 4 of Table17). 
The impact of the recovery rate (REC-INS) variable, though, is significant only in model 4 of 
Table 17 where we control for the rest of the resolving insolvency variables. The positive 
impact of insolvency time (lnTIME-INS) and insolvency cost (COST-INS) is further 
confirmed in the dynamic panel analysis (see models 1 and 2 of Table 18). On the other hand 
the recovery rate variable (REC-INS) is negatively associated with bank performance at the 
1% significance level in model 3 of Table 18. This result of the recovery rate variable (REC-
INS) remains significant in model 4 of Table 18 where all the resolving insolvency variables 
are accounted for. The positive association of time to insolvency (lnTIME-INS) with bank 
performance could indicate, in accordance with previous evidence, that the recovery rate for 
creditors is higher for firms that can stay in business during the bankruptcy procedure (Franks 
et al, 2004). In addition, the positive association between bank performance and insolvency 
costs (COST-INS) and the negative association between the recovery rate (REC-INS) on 
bank performance suggests that a careful loan screening exercise during the loan origination 
process pays off (Manove et al., 2001; Zazzaro, 2005) even in the presence of creditor 
friendly bankruptcy regulation (Franks and Sussman, 2005). 
The interaction terms between resolving insolvency regulation and the rule of law (RL-WB) 
and the control of corruption (COR-WB) show that the impact of these types of insolvency 
regulation on bank performance is conditional on institutional quality.  
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(Insert Table 19 about here) 
Model 1 of Table 19 shows that the effect of insolvency time (ln-TIME-INS) on bank 
performance is negative whilst its interaction with the rule of law (RL-WB) is positive, 
implying that insolvency time could have a positive impact on bank performance in line with 
Franks et al. (2004), in presence of high levels of rule of law and judicial efficiency, which 
ensures that creditors continue to receive payments during the time that a firm remains 
operational.  Similarly, the interaction between the insolvency time (lnTIME-INS) and the 
control of corruption (COR-WB) is positive (see model 4 of Table 19) in line with the “sand 
the wheels” hypothesis (Murphy et al., 1993), whereas the individual effect of insolvency 
time on bank performance is negative Finally, in model 3 of Table 19 there is a negative 
effect stemming from the interaction between recovery rate (REC-INS) and the rule of law 
(RL-WB), while the individual effect of the recovery rate (REC-INS) on bank performance is 
positive. This suggests an excessive reliance, at the expense of careful monitoring, of bank 
managers on the recovery rate in case of insolvency (REC-INS) when the observance of law 
is high. 
3.3.7 Employing workers 
Finally the impact of regulation related to employing workers on bank performance is 
depicted in Tables 20 and 21. The components of this category are the following: i) minimum 
wage, ii) severance payment and iii) notice period for worker dismissal. 
 
(Insert Tables 20 and 21 about here) 
Minimum wage (MW-EW) and severance payment (SEV-EW) are positively related to bank 
performance in both the fixed effects and dynamic specifications.  In more detail, the 
minimum wage (MW-EW) has a positive and statistically significant impact at the 1% level 
in the fixed effects panel (see models 1 and 4 of Table 20) and it retains its significance level 
in the dynamic panel (see model 4 of Table 21). Similarly, the positive coefficient of the 
impact of severance payment (SEV-EW) on bank performance is statistically significant at 
the 1% in the dynamic panel specifications (see models 2 and 4 of Table 21).  On the other 
hand, the variable related to the notice period of worker dismissal (NOT-EW) is negatively 
and significantly related with bank performance in both the fixed effects and dynamic models 
(see models 2 and 4 of Table 20 and model 4 of Table 21).  The magnitude of the coefficients 
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though of the minimum wage (MW-EW) and the severance payment (SEV-EW) variables are 
larger than the coefficient of the notice dismissal variable implying that, overall, stricter 
employment legislation has a positive impact on bank performance. Stringent labour 
regulation can have a positive impact on bank performance as it could increase the length  of 
the relationship between employees and  employers, rising in that way the returns on the 
acquisition of firm and industry specific skills (Wasmer, 2006). Furthermore, more stringent 
labour regulation can have a negative impact on labour turnover, reducing in that way costs, 
and lead to job matches of high quality (Auer, 2007). 
 Moreover, significant employment security provides workers with insurance against wage 
risk (Agell, 1999) and thereby could stimulate workers to raise their productivity. These 
results also conform to extant studies in the labour economics literature with regards to the 
impact of labour regulation on economic performance (Storm and Naastepad, 2009; Deakin 
and Sarkar, 2008). Finally, the interaction terms of the employment legislation variables and 
institutional quality reveals that the impact of strict labour regulation on bank performance is 
conditional on law observance. 
(Insert Table 22 about here) 
An important finding is that the interaction between rule of law (RL-WB) and the minimum 
wage (MW-EW) is positive and significant (see model 1 of Table 22), whereas the individual 
effect of minimum wage (MW-EW) on bank performance is negative.  This interaction 
suggests that minimum wage (MW-EW) could prove beneficial for bank performance when 
such legislation is actually enforced. The mere existence of the minimum wage regulation 
without its strict enforcement may induce informality (Ullyssea, 2010; Almedia and Carneiro, 
2011) making it harder for banks to evaluate the creditworthiness of individuals which could 
in turn result to decreased performance of the banking sector.  
3.4 Sensitivity Analysis: Is the impact of Getting Credit Regulation and Protecting Investors 
Regulation on Bank Performance Heterogeneous in the Crisis Period (2008-2010)?  
As part of sensitivity analysis we examine if the getting credit and protecting investors 
regulation variables have a heterogeneous impact on bank performance over the financial 
crisis. For this reason we follow Anginer et al. (2012) and use a crisis dummy variable for the 
years from 2008 to 2010. Then we interact the crisis dummy with the different indices of the 
getting credit and protecting investors regulation variables.  Results are depicted in Tables 23 
and 24.  
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(Insert Table 23 about here) 
The interaction between the creditor rights (LEG-CG) and the crisis dummy (CRISIS DUM) 
(see model 1 of Table 23) is positive and significant at the 5% level. On the other hand, the 
individual effect of creditor rights (LEG-CG) asserts a negative and significant impact on 
performance, which is in line with the previous findings of this study. The positive sign of the 
interaction between creditor rights (LEG-CG) and the crisis dummy (CRISIS DUM) implies 
that although the individual effect of creditor rights on bank performance is negative, it 
becomes restrained during the crisis. Agency problems that restrict a firm’s access to credit 
are particularly important during periods of economic contraction (Bernanke and Gertler; 
1989) and increased creditor rights may moderate them as they warrant a higher level of 
recovery of impaired loans. Furthermore, the interaction between the depth of credit 
information (DEPTH-CG) and the crisis dummy (CRISIS DUM) (see model 2 of Table 23) 
has a positive and significant effect on performance, whilst the individual effect of the depth 
of credit information (DEPTH-CG) is positive. It appears that the positive impact of the depth 
of credit information (DEPTH-CG) on bank performance strengthens during the crisis, acting 
as an assistance mechanism for banks to make more informed decisions with regards to the 
supply of credit. Similarly, the positive and significant interaction between the private sector 
credit registry coverage (PV-CG) and the crisis dummy (CRISIS DUM) in model 4 of Table 
23 suggest that during the crisis, higher credit registry coverage supports performance.   
Next we examine if the different types of regulation of the Protecting Investors category had 
a heterogeneous impact on the performance of banks located in the EU-27 economies during 
the crisis period. 
Insert Table 24 about here 
 
We find that the interaction between the director liability index (LIA-PI) with the crisis 
dummy (CRISIS-DUM) is positive and significant at the 1% level (see model 2 of Table 24) 
while the individual effect of the director liability index (LIA-PI) is positive and significant at 
the 1% level. The results for the individual effects confirm the fixed effects and dynamic 
analysis results in Table 14 and Table 15. The result of the interaction term denotes that in 
times of crisis the positive effect of the director liability index (LIA-PI) on bank performance 
is further enhanced. This is consistent with the findings of Peni and Vähämaa (2012) who 
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argue that banks with stronger corporate governance mechanisms performed better during the 
financial crisis. Furthermore, improved corporate governance regulation can positively affect 
firm performance in the non-financial sector (Ammann et al., 2011; Brown and Caylor, 2006, 
Brown and Caylor 2009; Gompers et al. 2003), especially at times of crisis when the 
deterioration of economic conditions can lead to increased expropriation by managers 
(Johnson et al, 2000; Mitton, 2002; Baek et al. 2004). This positive impact of corporate 
governance regulation on the performance of non-financial firms could be channelled to the 
banking sector via spill-over effects such as lower loan defaults. 
4. Conclusion   
Our results, from both fixed effects models as well as dynamic panel specifications, confirm 
that several types of business regulation have a heterogeneous in terms of sign and magnitude 
impact on bank performance, as measured by cost efficiency, in the EU-27 over 2004-2010. 
In some detail, the strength of creditor rights is negatively related with bank performance, 
whereas credit information sharing improves bank efficiency. Regulation related to business 
entry is reported to have a negative effect on bank performance. The same applies for 
taxation regulation. On the other hand, labour regulation, in terms of minimum wage and 
dismissal costs, as well as regulation related to investor protection, with the exception of 
mandatory corporate disclosure, exert a positive impact on bank performance. 
This study also finds, in many cases, a statistically significant impact of the interaction terms 
between the business regulation variables and country-specific institutional quality as 
measured by the rule of law (RL-WB) and corruption (COR-WB) variables. The impact of 
these interaction terms on bank performance is heterogeneous in terms of sign. For example, 
the positive impact of information sharing on bank performance, as measured by private 
sector credit registry coverage, becomes more subdued in the presence of higher law 
observance, as the interaction term between rule of law (RL-WB) and the private sector credit 
registry coverage (PV-CG) is negative. Similarly, the coefficient of the interaction term 
between tax hours (TAX-HOURS) and control of corruption (COR-WB) is positive, which 
implies that the negative individual effect of (TAX-HOURS) on bank performance becomes 
more restrained in the presence of higher control of corruption (COR-WB). 
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Regarding policy implications, regulators should take into account that enhancing creditor 
rights could have an adverse impact on bank performance. On the other hand strengthening 
regulation related to credit information sharing is warranted as it improves bank performance 
especially at the crisis period.  In addition, less rigid business entry regulations in the EU not 
only could positively affect competitiveness but also significantly increase bank performance. 
Taxation regulation exerts a negative effect on bank performance. For many EU economies 
the taxation level is a mean of increased government revenue in order to wither the sovereign 
debt crisis. However, governments should simplify at least the bureaucracy related tax 
compliance costs in order to offset this negative taxation impact. EU regulators should also 
take into account that less rigid labour market regulation, a policy measure that many EU 
economies are adapting to improve their competitiveness, may adversely affect bank 
performance. Furthermore, the enhancement of corporate governance regulation is desirable 
as the extent of director liability is found to exert a positive effect on bank performance 
especially during the crisis.  Finally, the quality of institutions such as the rule of law and 
control of corruption does matter in terms of the impact of business regulation on bank 
performance and policy makers should take note of this.   
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Table 1.  Bank Efficiencies EU-27 (2004-2010) based on SFA.  
Country	  Bank	  Efficiency	  in	  the	  EU-­‐27	  
Country	   EFF	   s.d.	   Country	   EFF	   s.d.	  
AUSTRIA	   0.861	   0.150	   LATVIA	   0.793	   0.084	  
BELGIUM	   0.767	   0.147	   LITHUANIA	   0.739	   0.112	  
BULGARIA	   0.683	   0.116	   LUXEMBOURG	   0.675	   0.171	  
CYPRUS	   0.817	   0.148	   MALTA	   0.728	   0.209	  
CZECH	  REPUBLIC	   0.775	   0.124	   NETHERLANDS	   0.737	   0.159	  
DENMARK	   0.907	   0.064	   POLAND	   0.752	   0.117	  
ESTONIA	   0.783	   0.123	   PORTUGAL	   0.797	   0.124	  
FINLAND	   0.825	   0.115	   ROMANIA	   0.606	   0.119	  
FRANCE	   0.791	   0.148	   SLOVAKIA	   0.749	   0.127	  
GERMANY	   0.883	   0.087	   SLOVENIA	   0.902	   0.058	  
GREECE	   0.827	   0.075	   SPAIN	   0.879	   0.11	  
HUNGARY	   0.597	   0.133	   SWEDEN	   0.857	   0.103	  
IRELAND	   0.818	   0.131	   UNITED	  KINGDOM	   0.746	   0.162	  
ITALY	   0.886	   0.103	   EU-­‐27	   0.834	   0.138	  
Over	  Time	  Bank	  Efficiency	  in	  the	  EU-­‐27	  (2004-­‐2010)	  
year	   EFF	   s.d.	   year	   EFF	   s.d.	  
2004	   0.826	   0.143	   2008	   0.808	   0.146	  
2005	   0.846	   0.129	   2009	   0.844	   0.135	  
2006	   0.845	   0.135	   2010	   0.846	   0.129	  
2007	   0.827	   0.14	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Note: The table reports the mean cost efficiency scores (EFF) by country and by time over the 2004-2010 
periods. The cost efficiencies were estimated using stochastic frontier analysis and assuming a common cross-
country frontier.     
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Table 2.  Starting a Business: Fixed Effects Panel Analysis.   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES EFF EFF EFF EFF EFF 
      
lnTA 0.0148** 0.0141* 0.0118 0.0141* 0.0116 
 (0.00738) (0.00727) (0.00738) (0.00738) (0.00746) 
EA 0.0135 0.0101 0.00428 0.0115 0.00345 
 (0.0662) (0.0661) (0.0659) (0.0662) (0.0661) 
LA 0.0893*** 0.0911*** 0.0834*** 0.0896*** 0.0867*** 
 (0.0214) (0.0212) (0.0214) (0.0211) (0.0216) 
LLPL 0.246*** 0.243*** 0.235*** 0.242*** 0.230*** 
 (0.0788) (0.0787) (0.0783) (0.0784) (0.0779) 
NIM -0.00625*** -0.00608*** -0.00598*** -0.00625*** -0.00597*** 
 (0.00191) (0.00191) (0.00192) (0.00191) (0.00193) 
ROE 0.000520*** 0.000527*** 0.000533*** 0.000532*** 0.000545*** 
 (0.000161) (0.000161) (0.000165) (0.000164) (0.000167) 
lnGDPcap -0.109*** -0.129*** -0.120*** -0.131*** -0.150*** 
 (0.0275) (0.0300) (0.0273) (0.0289) (0.0327) 
DCP -0.000386*** -0.000408*** -0.000451*** -0.000374*** -0.000438*** 
 (9.76e-05) (9.77e-05) (9.69e-05) (9.71e-05) (9.83e-05) 
RL-WB -0.0308** -0.0257* -0.0323** -0.0259* -0.0250 
 (0.0153) (0.0153) (0.0152) (0.0154) (0.0158) 
lnPRO-SB -0.00773    0.0172* 
 (0.00888)    (0.0101) 
lnDAYS-SB  -0.00629**   -0.00418 
  (0.00275)   (0.00296) 
COST-SB   -0.00260***  -0.00246*** 
   (0.000744)  (0.000787) 
MINCAP-SB    -0.000156*** -0.000113** 
    (4.62e-05) (4.79e-05) 
Constant 1.811*** 2.023*** 1.985*** 2.031*** 2.265*** 
 (0.245) (0.282) (0.253) (0.272) (0.307) 
      
Observations 
F-test                                                              
10,883 
     8.73*** 
10,883 
     8.68*** 
10,883 
      9.68*** 
10,883 
     9.54*** 
10,883 
      7.74*** 
R-squared 0.036 0.037 0.040 0.037 0.041 
Number of banks 2,014 2,014 2,014 2,014 2,014 
Note: The table reports the fixed-effects regression results for the starting a business category of business regulation. The 
use of the fixed effects specification is justified after a Hausman test for each model. The dependent variable (EFF) is the 
cost efficiency scores calculated using SFA and assuming common frontier across countries. TA stands for total assets, EA 
stands for the equity to assets ratio, LLPL is the ratio of loan loss provision to total loans, LA stands for the loan to total 
assets ratio, NIM stands for net interest margin, ROE stands for return of equity, DCP stands for the ratio of domestic credit 
to the private sector over GDP, GDPcap is GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) constant 2005 international $, 
RL-WB stands for rule of law. PR-SB: the total number of procedures required to register a firm, DAYS-SB: the total 
number of days required to register a firm, COST-SB: cost required to complete each procedure, MINCAP-SB: the amount 
that the entrepreneur needs to deposit in a bank or with a notary before registration and up to 3 months following 
incorporation and is recorded as a percentage of the economy’s income per capita. To avoid collinearity problems with the 
selected variables, we first analyse correlations of all the selected variables. We observe that there is not a high level of 
correlation between the variables used in the models. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels 
respectively. Robust Standard errors are in parentheses.   
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Table 3.  Starting a Business: Dynamic Panel Analysis.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES EFF EFF EFF EFF EFF 
      
L.EFF 0.531*** 0.519*** 0.487*** 0.511*** 0.477*** 
 (0.0492) (0.0517) (0.0522) (0.0495) (0.0533) 
lnTA 0.0188** 0.0165* 0.0166* 0.0170* 0.0136 
 (0.00941) (0.00936) (0.00919) (0.00916) (0.00911) 
EA 0.435*** 0.423*** 0.410*** 0.410*** 0.385*** 
 (0.114) (0.118) (0.118) (0.115) (0.118) 
LA -0.0542 -0.0553 -0.0577 -0.0529 -0.0588* 
 (0.0358) (0.0356) (0.0358) (0.0354) (0.0356) 
LLPL 0.0639 0.0853 0.0355 0.00940 -0.0141 
 (0.123) (0.123) (0.115) (0.110) (0.109) 
NIM -0.00848*** -0.00828*** -0.00838*** -0.00883*** -0.00867*** 
 (0.00184) (0.00186) (0.00182) (0.00180) (0.00178) 
ROE 0.000795*** 0.000839*** 0.000866*** 0.000870*** 0.000943*** 
 (0.000234) (0.000243) (0.000248) (0.000253) (0.000266) 
lnGDPcap -0.412*** -0.432*** -0.420*** -0.432*** -0.453*** 
 (0.0348) (0.0368) (0.0341) (0.0342) (0.0388) 
DCP 0.000128 0.000118 3.52e-06 0.000137 3.40e-05 
 (0.000164) (0.000169) (0.000168) (0.000160) (0.000170) 
RL-WB 0.0324 0.0328 0.0191 0.0422** 0.0327 
 (0.0204) (0.0203) (0.0204) (0.0205) (0.0207) 
lnPRO-SB -0.0109    0.0222 
 (0.0126)    (0.0136) 
lnDAYS-SB  -0.00679   -0.00494 
  (0.00419)   (0.00469) 
COST-SB   -0.00357***  -0.00272** 
   (0.00106)  (0.00131) 
MINCAP-SB    -0.000221*** -0.000196*** 
    (6.99e-05) (7.34e-05) 
Constant 4.345*** 4.603*** 4.544*** 4.577*** 4.890*** 
 (0.301) (0.359) (0.308) (0.312) (0.377) 
      
Observations 8,871 8,871 8,871 8,871 8,871 
Number of banks 
N of instruments 
Wald 
AR2 p-value 
Hansen-J p-value 
1,897 
31 
    346.78*** 
0.1518 
0.250 
1,897 
31 
   343.01*** 
     0.1319 
     0.443 
1,897 
31 
351.17*** 
    0.1428 
     0.278 
1,897 
31 
355.48*** 
     0.1120 
     0.246 
1,897 
31 
360.88*** 
0.1876 
0.446 
Note: The table reports the dynamic panel results for the starting a business category of business regulation. The dependent 
variable (EFF) is the cost efficiency scores calculated using SFA and assuming common frontier across countries. TA stands 
for total assets, EA stands for the equity to assets ratio, LLPL is the ratio of loan loss provision to total loans, LA stands for 
the loan to total assets ratio, NIM stands for net interest margin, ROE stands for return of equity, DCP stands for the ratio of 
domestic credit to the private sector over GDP, GDPcap is GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) constant 2005 
international $, RL-WB stands for rule of law. PR-SB: the total number of procedures required to register a firm, DAYS-SB: 
the total number of days required to register a firm, COST-SB: cost required completing each procedure, MINCAP-SB: the 
amount that the entrepreneur needs to deposit in a bank or with a notary before registration and up to 3 months following 
incorporation and is recorded as a percentage of the economy’s income per capita. To avoid collinearity problems with the 
selected variables, we first analyse correlations of all the selected variables. We observe that there is not a high level of 
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correlation between the variables used in the models. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels 
respectively. Robust Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
Table 4.  Starting a Business: Interactions with Institutional Quality. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES EFF EFF EFF EFF EFF EFF EFF EFF 
         
L.eff 0.531*** 0.509*** 0.475*** 0.514*** 0.549*** 0.521*** 0.483*** 0.533*** 
 (0.0494) (0.0517) (0.0575) (0.0497) (0.0519) (0.0519) (0.0561) (0.0508) 
lnTA 0.0189** 0.0175* 0.0160* 0.0177* 0.0213** 0.0185* 0.0192** 0.0197** 
 (0.00929) (0.00947) (0.00916) (0.00914) (0.00944) (0.00946) (0.00917) (0.00908) 
EA 0.432*** 0.436*** 0.401*** 0.411*** 0.432*** 0.429*** 0.408*** 0.420*** 
 (0.115) (0.119) (0.120) (0.112) (0.111) (0.119) (0.115) (0.108) 
LA -0.0542 -0.0592* -0.0588 -0.0552 -0.0539 -0.0600* -0.0564 -0.0541 
 (0.0358) (0.0358) (0.0359) (0.0356) (0.0349) (0.0353) (0.0352) (0.0349) 
LLPL 0.0679 0.0802 0.0366 0.0115 0.0175 0.0636 0.0217 -0.0182 
 (0.123) (0.125) (0.115) (0.110) (0.127) (0.135) (0.119) (0.116) 
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Note: The table reports the dynamic panel results for the starting a business category of business regulation and their interaction with 
institutional quality. The dependent variable (EFF) is the cost efficiency scores calculated using SFA and assuming common frontier across 
countries. TA stands for total assets, EA is the equity to assets ratio, LLPL is the ratio of loan loss provision to total loans, LA stands for the 
loan to total assets ratio, NIM stands for net interest margin, ROE stands for return of equity, DCP stands for the ratio of domestic credit to 
the private sector over GDP, GDPcap is GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) constant 2005 international $, RL-WB stands for 
rule of law, COR-WB stands for control of corruption. PR-SB: the total number of procedures required to register a firm, DAYS-SB: the 
total number of days required to register a firm, COST-SB: cost required completing each procedure, MINCAP-SB: the amount that the 
entrepreneur needs to deposit in a bank or with a notary before registration and up to 3 months following incorporation and is recorded as a 
percentage of the economy’s income per capita. To avoid collinearity problems with the selected variables, we first analyse correlations of 
all the selected variables. We observe that there is not a high level of correlation between the variables used in the models. ***, ** and * 
indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. Robust Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
 
Table 5. Getting Credit: Fixed Effects Panel Analysis. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES EFF EFF EFF EFF EFF 
      
lnTA 0.0136* 0.0119 0.0137* 0.00893 0.00779 
 (0.00759) (0.00761) (0.00803) (0.00817) (0.00851) 
EA 0.0146 0.00829 0.0204 0.0119 0.00626 
 (0.0784) (0.0785) (0.0823) (0.0851) (0.0870) 
NIM -0.00850*** -0.00829*** -0.00837*** -0.00878*** -0.00880*** -0.00848*** -0.00854*** -0.00919*** 
 (0.00184) (0.00186) (0.00181) (0.00180) (0.00199) (0.00202) (0.00196) (0.00198) 
ROE 0.000824*** 0.000896*** 0.000868*** 0.000858*** 0.000784*** 0.000847*** 0.000819*** 0.000779*** 
 (0.000239) (0.000251) (0.000249) (0.000252) (0.000237) (0.000249) (0.000247) (0.000251) 
lnGDPcap -0.411*** -0.435*** -0.422*** -0.431*** -0.378*** -0.430*** -0.403*** -0.398*** 
 (0.0345) (0.0385) (0.0343) (0.0342) (0.0341) (0.0388) (0.0324) (0.0324) 
DCP 0.000140 0.000111 2.05e-05 0.000120 0.000159 9.88e-05 -1.95e-05 0.000131 
 (0.000169) (0.000174) (0.000166) (0.000161) (0.000166) (0.000169) (0.000169) (0.000161) 
RL-WB 0.0363 0.0532 0.0331 0.0326     
 (0.0408) (0.0333) (0.0230) (0.0230)     
lnPRO-SB -0.00982    -0.0239    
 (0.0162)    (0.0154)    
RL-WB*lnPRO-SB -0.00156        
 (0.0179)        
lnDAYS-SB  0.00278    -0.00667   
  (0.0137)    (0.0108)   
RL-WB*lnDAYS-SB  -0.00790       
  (0.00914)       
COST-SB   -0.00185    -0.00255*  
   (0.00185)    (0.00150)  
RL-WB*COST-SB   -0.00150      
   (0.00140)      
MINCAP-SB    -0.000393*    -0.000422** 
    (0.000205)    (0.000178) 
RL-WB*MINCAP-SB    0.000133     
    (0.000131)     
COR-WB     0.0162 0.0602*** 0.0413*** 0.0215* 
     (0.0242) (0.0204) (0.0140) (0.0112) 
COR-WB*lnPRO-SB     0.00762    
     (0.0133)    
COR-WB*lnDAYS-SB      -0.00568   
      (0.00627)   
COR-WB*COST-SB       -0.00145  
       (0.00114)  
COR-WB*MINCAP-SB        0.000169 
        (0.000112) 
Constant 4.336*** 4.599*** 4.563*** 4.570*** 3.976*** 4.533*** 4.301*** 4.191*** 
 (0.300) (0.368) (0.310) (0.313) (0.315) (0.377) (0.306) (0.304) 
         
Observations 8,871 8,871 8,871 8,871 8,871 8,871 8,871 8,871 
Number of banks 
N of instruments 
Wald 
AR2 p-value 
Hansen-J p-value 
1,897 
32 
    345.81***     
0.1494 
0.179 
1,897 
32 
326.18*** 
0.1052 
0.378 
1,897 
32 
359.38*** 
0.1756 
0.443 
1,897 
32 
354.00*** 
0.1239 
0.452 
1,897 
32 
360.62*** 
0.1647 
0.585 
1,897 
32 
349.64*** 
   0.1359 
    0.625 
1,897 
32 
 370.26*** 
0.1113 
0.575 
1,897 
32 
373.60*** 
0.1624 
0.735 
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LA 0.0739*** 0.0709*** 0.0716*** 0.0676*** 0.0683*** 
 (0.0225) (0.0226) (0.0226) (0.0225) (0.0224) 
LLPL 0.278*** 0.277*** 0.279*** 0.250*** 0.249*** 
 (0.0893) (0.0891) (0.0894) (0.0912) (0.0901) 
NIM -0.00415** -0.00391** -0.00493*** -0.00416** -0.00411** 
 (0.00176) (0.00178) (0.00171) (0.00178) (0.00178) 
ROE 0.000658*** 0.000680*** 0.000654*** 0.000687*** 0.000682*** 
 (0.000159) (0.000163) (0.000165) (0.000173) (0.000174) 
lnGDPcap -0.249*** -0.266*** -0.222*** -0.273*** -0.303*** 
 (0.0307) (0.0318) (0.0295) (0.0332) (0.0349) 
DCP -0.000571*** -0.000603*** -0.000592*** -0.000699*** -0.000676*** 
 (0.000111) (0.000111) (0.000111) (0.000109) (0.000106) 
RL-WB 0.0293* 0.00665 0.00318 0.00880 0.00475 
 (0.0164) (0.0154) (0.0155) (0.0160) (0.0165) 
LEG-CG -0.00572***    -0.00108 
 (0.00160)    (0.00223) 
DEPTH-CG  0.00938***   0.0129*** 
  (0.00361)   (0.00382) 
PB-CG   -0.000247  -0.000277 
   (0.000279)  (0.000337) 
PV-CG     0.000772*** 0.000844*** 
    (0.000209) (0.000240) 
Constant     3.236***      3.389***      2.965***   3.521*** 3.790*** 
 (0.290) (0.302) (0.275) (0.323) (0.341) 
      
Observations 
F-test 
9,274 
    14.80*** 
9,274 
     14.54*** 
9,062 
    13.90*** 
9,027 
     15.41*** 
8,905 
     13.42*** 
R-squared 0.053 0.053 0.051 0.054 0.057 
Number of banks 1,943 1,943 1,933 1,926 1,926 
Note: The table reports the fixed-effects regression results for the getting credit category of business regulation. The use of the 
fixed effects specification is justified after a Hausman test for each model.  The dependent variable (EFF) is the cost efficiency 
scores calculated using SFA and a assuming common frontier across countries. TA stands for total assets, EA is the equity to 
assets ratio, LLPL is the ratio of loan loss provision to total loans, LA stands for the loan to total assets ratio, NIM stands for net 
interest margin, ROE stands for return of equity,  DCP stands for the  ratio of domestic credit to the private sector over GDP, 
GDPcap is GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) constant 2005 international $, RL-WB stands for rule of law. 
LEG-CG:  this index measures the degree to which collateral and bankruptcy laws protect the rights of borrowers and lenders 
and thus facilitate lending, PB-CG: this indicator reports the number of individuals and firms listed in a public credit registry 
with information on their borrowing history from the past 5 years, PR-CG: This indicator reports the number of individuals and 
firms listed by a private credit bureau with information on their borrowing history from the past 5 years, DEPTH-CG: this index 
measures rules and practices affecting the coverage, scope and accessibility of credit information available through either a 
public credit registry or a private credit bureau. To avoid collinearity problems with the selected variables, we first analyse 
correlations of all the selected variables. We observe that there is not a high level of correlation between the variables used in 
the models. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. Robust Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
Table 6. Getting Credit: Dynamic Panel Analysis. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES EFF EFF EFF EFF EFF 
      
L.EFF 0.533*** 0.481*** 0.543*** 0.537*** 0.526*** 
 (0.0493) (0.0511) (0.0541) (0.0526) (0.0549) 
lnTA 0.0158* 0.0262*** 0.0248** 0.0171* 0.0204* 
 (0.00935) (0.00897) (0.00983) (0.00960) (0.0105) 
EA 0.418*** 0.465*** 0.499*** 0.487*** 0.495*** 
 (0.121) (0.112) (0.110) (0.113) (0.112) 
LA -0.0401 -0.0513 -0.0531 -0.0495 -0.0523 
 (0.0343) (0.0344) (0.0357) (0.0362) (0.0347) 
LLPL 0.0761 0.0691 0.0470 0.0642 0.0732 
 (0.121) (0.117) (0.126) (0.131) (0.137) 
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NIM -0.00842*** -0.00856*** -0.00926*** -0.00762*** -0.00776*** 
 (0.00193) (0.00182) (0.00185) (0.00178) (0.00173) 
ROE 0.000753*** 0.000812*** 0.000711*** 0.000762*** 0.000710*** 
 (0.000231) (0.000233) (0.000240) (0.000261) (0.000258) 
lnGDPcap -0.387*** -0.424*** -0.415*** -0.434*** -0.397*** 
 (0.0354) (0.0335) (0.0374) (0.0474) (0.0517) 
DCP 0.000169 3.82e-05 0.000229 0.000121 0.000169 
 (0.000159) (0.000165) (0.000160) (0.000176) (0.000180) 
RL-WB 0.0484** 0.0418** 0.0331 0.0376* 0.0610*** 
 (0.0207) (0.0194) (0.0211) (0.0204) (0.0214) 
LEG-CG -0.00825***    -0.00871** 
 (0.00232)    (0.00339) 
DEPTH-CG  0.0185***   0.0113* 
  (0.00433)   (0.00591) 
PB-CG   -0.000983  -0.00112* 
   (0.000691)  (0.000640) 
PV-CG    0.000255 8.39e-05 
    (0.000261) (0.000258) 
Constant 4.136*** 4.292*** 4.252*** 4.547*** 4.103*** 
 (0.303) (0.296) (0.317) (0.416) (0.421) 
      
Observations 8,871 8,871 8,675 8,648 8,535 
Number of banks 
N of instruments 
Wald 
AR2 p-value 
Hansen-J p-value 
1,897 
31 
394.78*** 
0.1652 
0.436 
1,897 
31 
   366.15*** 
0.1180 
0.345 
1,886 
31 
298.66*** 
0.2604 
0.621 
1,881 
31 
286.74*** 
0.1885 
0.418 
1,879 
34 
361.79*** 
0.2620 
0.158 
Note: The table reports the dynamic panel regression results for the getting credit category of business regulation .The dependent variable 
(EFF) is the cost efficiency scores calculated using SFA and assuming common frontier across countries. TA stands for total assets, EA is 
the equity to assets ratio, LLPL: the ratio of loan loss provision to total loans, LA stands for the loan to total assets ratio, NIM stands for net 
interest margin, ROE stands for return of equity, DCP stands for the ratio of domestic credit to the private sector over GDP, GDPcap is GDP 
per capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) constant 2005 international $, RL-WB stands for rule of law. LEG-CG:  this index measures the 
degree to which collateral and bankruptcy laws protect the rights of borrowers and lenders and thus facilitate lending, PB-CG: this indicator 
reports the number of individuals and firms listed in a public credit registry with information on their borrowing history from the past 5 
years, PR-CG: this indicator reports the number of individuals and firms listed by a private credit bureau with information on their 
borrowing history from the past 5 years, DEPTH-CG: this index measures rules and practices affecting the coverage, scope and accessibility 
of credit information available through either a public credit registry or a private credit bureau. To avoid collinearity problems with the 
selected variables, we first analyse correlations of all the selected variables. We observe that there is not a high level of correlation between 
the variables used in the models. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. Robust Standard errors are in 
parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7. Getting Credit: Interaction with Institutional Quality  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES EFF EFF EFF EFF EFF EFF EFF EFF 
         
L.EFF 0.532*** 0.512*** 0.537*** 0.533*** 0.559*** 0.509*** 0.545*** 0.539*** 
 (0.0529) (0.0565) (0.0543) (0.0522) (0.0515) (0.0540) (0.0556) (0.0523) 
lnTA 0.0175* 0.0213** 0.0249** 0.0157 0.0204** 0.0228** 0.0224** 0.0188* 
 (0.00984) (0.00925) (0.00976) (0.00956) (0.00983) (0.00962) (0.0101) (0.00984) 
EA 0.420*** 0.432*** 0.496*** 0.502*** 0.419*** 0.427*** 0.469*** 0.494*** 
 (0.121) (0.115) (0.108) (0.110) (0.116) (0.115) (0.106) (0.105) 
LA -0.0373 -0.0495 -0.0491 -0.0513 -0.0381 -0.0502 -0.0422 -0.0570 
 (0.0349) (0.0344) (0.0355) (0.0359) (0.0338) (0.0343) (0.0349) (0.0353) 
LLPL 0.0720 0.0900 0.0529 0.0638 -0.00959 0.0106 -0.0181 0.0432 
 (0.119) (0.113) (0.128) (0.126) (0.119) (0.114) (0.131) (0.129) 
NIM -0.00851*** -0.00825*** -0.00915*** -0.00773*** -0.00946*** -0.00891*** -0.00959*** -0.00778*** 
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 (0.00189) (0.00176) (0.00188) (0.00175) (0.00220) (0.00184) (0.00205) (0.00184) 
ROE 0.000747*** 0.000810*** 0.000716*** 0.000735*** 0.000645*** 0.000751*** 0.000706*** 0.000668*** 
 (0.000228) (0.000220) (0.000240) (0.000257) (0.000227) (0.000226) (0.000252) (0.000251) 
lnGDPcap -0.394*** -0.437*** -0.417*** -0.412*** -0.370*** -0.410*** -0.395*** -0.415*** 
 (0.0360) (0.0329) (0.0380) (0.0499) (0.0391) (0.0338) (0.0366) (0.0471) 
DCP 0.000142 8.83e-05 0.000220 5.40e-05 0.000226 0.000104 0.000251 3.44e-05 
 (0.000165) (0.000160) (0.000159) (0.000170) (0.000158) (0.000162) (0.000160) (0.000175) 
RL-WB 0.0443 0.159** 0.0325 0.0768***     
 (0.0480) (0.0664) (0.0209) (0.0276)     
LEG-CG -0.00904    0.00315    
 (0.0118)    (0.00883)    
RL-WB*LEG-CG 0.000560        
 (0.00710)        
DEPTH-CG  0.0279***    0.0243***   
  (0.00673)    (0.00615)   
RL-WB*DEPTH-CG  -0.0206*       
  (0.0112)       
PB-CG   -0.00120    -0.00137*  
   (0.000998)    (0.000729)  
RL-WB*PB-CG   0.000207      
   (0.000880)      
PV-CG    0.00126***    0.000938*** 
    (0.000465)    (0.000357) 
RL-WB*PV-CG    -0.000817**     
    (0.000372)     
COR-WB     0.0800** 0.0958* 0.0136 0.0615*** 
     (0.0344) (0.0544) (0.0121) (0.0196) 
COR-WB*LEG-CG     -0.00666    
     (0.00479)    
COR-WB*DEPTH-CG      -0.0137   
      (0.0106)   
COR-WB*PB-CG       0.00162*  
       (0.000896)  
COR-WB*PV-GC        -0.000358 
        (0.000291) 
Constant 4.186*** 4.400*** 4.275*** 4.305*** 3.817*** 4.161*** 4.093*** 4.292*** 
 (0.315) (0.293) (0.324) (0.449) (0.321) (0.317) (0.320) (0.411) 
         
Observations 8,871 8,871 8,675 8,648 8,871 8,871 8,675 8,648 
Number of banks 
N of instruments 
Wald 
AR2 p-value 
Hansen-J p-value 
1,897 
32   
 395.04*** 
0.1645 
0.397 
1,897 
32 
   390.24*** 
0.1926 
0.451 
1,886 
32 
  298.80*** 
0.2478 
0.517 
1,881 
32 
 319.54*** 
0.1833 
0.490 
1,897 
32 
    399.47*** 
0.2106 
0.313 
1,897 
32 
    383.28*** 
0.1944 
0.516 
1,886 
32 
314.69*** 
0.3145 
0.648 
1,881 
32 
328.29*** 
0.2011 
0.696 
Note: The table reports the dynamic panel regression results for the getting credit category of business regulation and their interaction with 
institutional quality .The dependent variable (EFF) is the cost efficiency scores calculated using SFA and a assuming common frontier 
across countries. TA stands for total assets, EA is the equity to assets ratio, LLPL is the ratio of loan loss provision to total loans, L/A stands 
for the loan to total assets ratio, NIM stands for net interest margin, ROE stands for return of equity, DCP stands for the  ratio of domestic 
credit to the private sector over GDP, GDPcap is GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) constant 2005 international $, RL-WB 
stands for rule of law, COR-WB stands for  control of corruption. LEG-CG: this index measures the degree to which collateral and 
bankruptcy laws protect the rights of borrowers and lenders and thus facilitate lending, PB-CG: this indicator reports the number of 
individuals and firms listed in a public credit registry with information on their borrowing history from the past 5 years, PR-CG: this 
indicator reports the number of individuals and firms listed by a private credit bureau with information on their borrowing history from the 
past 5 years, DEPTH-CG: this index measures rules and practices affecting the coverage, scope and accessibility of credit information 
available through either a public credit registry or a private credit bureau. To avoid collinearity problems with the selected variables, we first 
analyse correlations of all the selected variables. We observe that there is not a high level of correlation between the variables used in the 
models. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. Robust Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
 
Table 8.  Paying Taxes: Fixed Effects Panel Analysis 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
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Note: The table reports the fixed-effects regression results for the paying taxes category of business regulation.. The use of 
the fixed effects specification is justified after a Hausman test for each model. The dependent variable (EFF) is the cost 
efficiency scores calculated using SFA and assuming common frontier across countries. TA stands for total assets, EA is the 
equity to assets ratio,  LLPL is the ratio of loan loss provision to total loans, LA stands for the loan to total assets ratio, NIM 
stands for net interest margin, ROE stands for return of equity, DCP stands for the ratio of domestic credit to the private 
sector over GDP, GDPcap is GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) constant 2005 international $, RL-WB stands 
for rule of law. TAX-NUM: the total number of tax payments per year, TAX-HOURS: the time it takes to prepare, file and 
pay (or withhold) the corporate income tax, the value added tax and social security contributions (in hours per year), TAX-
PROFIT:  the amount of taxes on profits paid by the business as a percentage of commercial profits. To avoid collinearity 
problems with the selected variables, we first analyse correlations of all the selected variables. We observe that there is not a 
high level of correlation between the variables used in the models. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance 
levels respectively. Robust Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9.  Paying Taxes: Dynamic Panel Analysis 
 
VARIABLES EFF EFF EFF EFF 
     
lnTA 0.0133 0.0157* 0.0147* 0.0124 
 (0.00892) (0.00865) (0.00891) (0.00916) 
EA 0.00317 0.0175 0.0138 -3.69e-05 
 (0.102) (0.101) (0.102) (0.103) 
LA 0.0601** 0.0642*** 0.0628*** 0.0589** 
 (0.0240) (0.0239) (0.0239) (0.0241) 
LLPL 0.303*** 0.300*** 0.295*** 0.298*** 
 (0.114) (0.113) (0.113) (0.114) 
NIM -0.00153 -0.00159 -0.00153 -0.00148 
 (0.00211) (0.00211) (0.00213) (0.00213) 
ROE 0.000633*** 0.000614*** 0.000615*** 0.000634*** 
 (0.000179) (0.000175) (0.000175) (0.000179) 
lnGDPcap -0.341*** -0.346*** -0.352*** -0.346*** 
 (0.0409) (0.0413) (0.0410) (0.0415) 
DCP -0.000761*** -0.000757*** -0.000785*** -0.000783*** 
 (0.000151) (0.000161) (0.000150) (0.000158) 
RL-WB -0.000768 0.00419 0.00743 0.00220 
 (0.0173) (0.0178) (0.0180) (0.0185) 
lnTAX-NUM -0.0149**   -0.0149** 
 (0.00581)   (0.00579) 
lnTAX-HOURS  -0.00721  0.00718 
  (0.0261)  (0.0269) 
TAX-PRO   -0.000486 -0.000430 
   (0.000469) (0.000483) 
Constant 4.257*** 4.266*** 4.324*** 4.305*** 
 (0.420) (0.431) (0.430) (0.435) 
     
Observations 
F-test 
7,660 
     11.62*** 
7,660 
10.90*** 
7,660 
     11.38*** 
7,660 
   10.33*** 
R-squared 0.052 0.050 0.051 0.052 
Number of banks 1,865 1,865 1,865 1,865 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES EFF EFF EFF EFF 
     
L.EFF 0.441*** 0.500*** 0.433*** 0.487*** 
 (0.0622) (0.0638) (0.0663) (0.0664) 
lnTA 0.00890 0.00543 0.0100 0.00377 
 (0.00896) (0.00864) (0.00949) (0.00877) 
EA 0.522*** 0.498*** 0.528*** 0.452*** 
 (0.159) (0.158) (0.162) (0.162) 
LA -0.0781** -0.0357 -0.0647* -0.0439 
 (0.0349) (0.0333) (0.0353) (0.0340) 
LLPL 0.231 0.125 0.215 0.126 
 (0.160) (0.156) (0.158) (0.157) 
NIM -0.00662*** -0.00736*** -0.00659*** -0.00718*** 
 (0.00186) (0.00187) (0.00188) (0.00186) 
ROE 0.00101*** 0.000993*** 0.000961*** 0.00105*** 
 (0.000295) (0.000285) (0.000288) (0.000295) 
lnGDPcap -0.436*** -0.482*** -0.469*** -0.465*** 
 (0.0370) (0.0350) (0.0408) (0.0375) 
DCP 0.000215 4.23e-06 0.000195 -6.37e-05 
 (0.000195) (0.000180) (0.000201) (0.000177) 
RL-WB 0.00431 -0.0318 0.0137 -0.0407* 
 (0.0236) (0.0244) (0.0248) (0.0244) 
lnTAX-NUM -0.0280***   -0.0221** 
 (0.00935)   (0.00947) 
lnTAX-HOURS  -0.200***  -0.193*** 
  (0.0386)  (0.0430) 
TAX-PRO   -0.000924** 1.10e-05 
   (0.000443) (0.000482) 
Constant 4.890*** 6.405*** 5.183*** 6.310*** 
 (0.382) (0.425) (0.452) (0.435) 
     
Observations 7,351 7,351 7,351 7,351 
Number of banks 
N of instruments 
Wald 
AR2 p-value 
Hansen-J p-value 
1,822 
30 
  356.11*** 
0.2245 
0.404 
1,822 
30 
420.11*** 
0.4399 
0.431 
1,822 
30 
336.28*** 
0.1479 
0.390 
1,822 
32 
     426.17*** 
0.4774 
           0.617 
Note: The table reports the dynamic panel regression results for the paying taxes category of business regulation. The 
dependent variable (EFF) is the cost efficiency scores calculated using SFA and assuming common frontier across countries. 
TA stands for total assets, EA is the equity to assets ratio, LLPL is the ratio of loan loss provision to total loans, LA stands 
for the loan to total assets ratio, NIM stands for net interest margin, ROE stands for return of equity, DCP stands for the ratio 
of domestic credit to the private sector over GDP, GDPcap is GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) constant 
2005 international $, RL-WB stands for rule of law. TAX-NUM: the total number of tax payments per year, TAX-HOURS: 
the time it takes to prepare, file and pay (or withhold) the corporate income tax, the value added tax and social security 
contributions (in hours per year), TAX-PROFIT:  the amount of taxes on profits paid by the business as a percentage of 
commercial profits. To avoid collinearity problems with the selected variables, we first analyse correlations of all the 
selected variables. We observe that there is not a high level of correlation between the variables used in the models. ***, ** 
and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. Robust Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 10.  Paying Taxes: Interactions with Institutional Quality 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES EFF EFF EFF EFF EFF EFF 
       
L.EFF 0.454*** 0.500*** 0.453*** 0.504*** 0.534*** 0.489*** 
 (0.0615) (0.0635) (0.0687) (0.0653) (0.0656) (0.0723) 
lnTA 0.00786 0.00510 0.00910 0.0196** 0.0195** 0.0193** 
 (0.00883) (0.00857) (0.00932) (0.00881) (0.00914) (0.00957) 
EA 0.503*** 0.505*** 0.506*** 0.603*** 0.612*** 0.576*** 
 (0.158) (0.157) (0.163) (0.158) (0.162) (0.164) 
LA -0.0705** -0.0351 -0.0609* -0.0535 -0.0234 -0.0507 
 (0.0339) (0.0333) (0.0347) (0.0325) (0.0320) (0.0338) 
LLPL 0.227 0.144 0.194 0.207 0.118 0.204 
 (0.160) (0.158) (0.155) (0.173) (0.170) (0.168) 
NIM -0.00668*** -0.00736*** -0.00671*** -0.00738*** -0.00764*** -0.00714*** 
 (0.00182) (0.00187) (0.00186) (0.00182) (0.00183) (0.00185) 
ROE 0.000962*** 0.00101*** 0.000984*** 0.000886*** 0.000922*** 0.000873*** 
 (0.000291) (0.000287) (0.000292) (0.000273) (0.000272) (0.000265) 
lnGDPcap -0.481*** -0.483*** -0.476*** -0.500*** -0.512*** -0.501*** 
 (0.0378) (0.0349) (0.0402) (0.0362) (0.0349) (0.0396) 
DCP 0.000144 1.86e-05 0.000352 0.000264 8.82e-05 0.000299 
 (0.000190) (0.000184) (0.000238) (0.000182) (0.000182) (0.000213) 
RL-WB -0.178*** 0.0210 0.106*    
 (0.0553) (0.280) (0.0606)    
lnTAX-NUM -0.113***   -0.0687***   
 (0.0269)   (0.0166)   
RL-WB*lnTAX-NUM 0.0705***      
 (0.0193)      
lnTAX-HOURS  -0.187***   -0.261***  
  (0.0657)   (0.0631)  
RL-WB*lnTAX-HOURS  -0.00979     
  (0.0533)     
TAX-PRO   0.00135   -0.000796 
   (0.00140)   (0.00133) 
RL-WB*TAX-PRO   -0.00168*    
   (0.000929)    
COR-WB    -0.0214 -0.400* 0.0840* 
    (0.0355) (0.226) (0.0434) 
COR-WB*lnTAX-NUM    0.0367***   
    (0.0125)   
COR-WB*lnTAX-HOURS     0.0855**  
     (0.0423)  
COR-WB*lnTAX-PRO      -0.000226 
      (0.000774) 
Constant 5.602*** 6.342*** 5.104*** 5.337*** 6.683*** 5.218*** 
 (0.417) (0.525) (0.456) (0.383) (0.504) (0.458) 
       
Observations 7,351 7,351 7,351 7,351 7,351 7,351 
Number of banks 
N of instruments 
Wald 
AR2 p-value 
Hansen-J p-value 
1,822 
31 
     382.37*** 
0.3060 
       0.308 
1,822 
31 
   443.90*** 
0.4421 
0.381 
1,822 
31 
      343.15*** 
0.1604 
0.355 
1,822 
31 
   421.12*** 
0.3454 
0.468 
1,822 
31 
441.14*** 
0.3970 
0.385 
1,822 
31 
389.76*** 
0.1744 
0.668 
Note: The table reports the dynamic panel regression results for the paying taxes category of business regulation and their 
interaction with institutional quality. The dependent variable (EFF) is the cost efficiency scores calculated using SFA and 
assuming common frontier across countries. TA stands for total assets, EA is the equity to assets ratio, LLPL is the ratio of 
loan loss provision to total loans, LA stands for the loan to total assets ratio, NIM stands for net interest margin, ROE stands 
for return of equity, DCP stands for the ratio of domestic credit to the private sector over GDP, GDPcap is GDP per capita in 
purchasing power parity (PPP) constant 2005 international $, RL-WB stands for rule of law, COR-WB stands for control of 
corruption. TAX-NUM: the total number of tax payments per year, TAX-HOURS: the time it takes to prepare, file and pay 
(or withhold) the corporate income tax, the value added tax and social security contributions (in hours per year), TAX-
PROFIT:  the amount of taxes on profits paid by the business as a percentage of commercial profits. To avoid collinearity 
problems with the selected variables, we first analyse correlations of all the selected variables. We observe that there is not a 
high level of correlation between the variables used in the models. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance 
levels respectively. Robust Standard errors are in parentheses 
 
 
Table 11. Enforcing Contracts: Fixed Effects Panel Analysis 
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Note: The table reports the fixed-effects regression results for the enforcing contracts category of business regulation. The 
use of the fixed effects specification is justified after a Hausman test for each model. The dependent variable (EFF) is the 
cost efficiency scores calculated using SFA and assuming common frontier across countries. TA stands for total assets, EA 
is the equity to assets ratio, LLPL is the ratio of loan loss provision to total loans, LA stands for the loan to total assets ratio, 
NIM stands for net interest margin, ROE stands for return of equity, DCP stands for the ratio of domestic credit to the 
private sector over GDP, GDPcap is GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) constant 2005 international $, RL-WB 
stands for rule of law. TIME-CON: the time (in terms of days) to resolve a dispute, counted from the moment the plaintiff 
files the lawsuit in court until payment. This includes both the days when actions take place and the waiting periods between, 
COST-CON: the cost in court fees and attorney fees, where the use of attorneys is mandatory or common, expressed as a 
percentage of the debt value, PRO-CON: the average number of procedures to enforce a contract. The list of procedural steps 
compiled for each economy traces the chronology of a commercial dispute before the relevant court, To avoid collinearity 
problems with the selected variables, we first analyse correlations of all the selected variables. We observe that there is not a 
high level of correlation between the variables used in the models. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance 
levels respectively. Robust Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
Table 12.  Enforcing Contracts:  Dynamic Panel Analysis 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES EFF EFF EFF 
    
lnTA 0.0155** 0.0153** 0.0153** 
 (0.00735) (0.00727) (0.00728) 
EA 0.0163 0.0151 0.0151 
 (0.0662) (0.0661) (0.0660) 
LA 0.0909*** 0.0909*** 0.0909*** 
 (0.0212) (0.0211) (0.0211) 
LLPL 0.246*** 0.243*** 0.244*** 
 (0.0788) (0.0784) (0.0787) 
NIM -0.00635*** -0.00629*** -0.00638*** 
 (0.00190) (0.00190) (0.00190) 
ROE 0.000517*** 0.000519*** 0.000520*** 
 (0.000162) (0.000162) (0.000162) 
lnGDPcap -0.110*** -0.111*** -0.113*** 
 (0.0273) (0.0273) (0.0272) 
DCP -0.000368*** -0.000371*** -0.000381*** 
 (9.69e-05) (9.71e-05) (9.81e-05) 
RL-WB -0.0305** -0.0293* -0.0307** 
 (0.0152) (0.0157) (0.0152) 
lnTIME-CON 0.00349   
 (0.0172)   
COST-CON  0.000761  
  (0.00116)  
lnPRO-CON   -0.0545 
   (0.0740) 
Constant 1.772*** 1.785*** 2.016*** 
 (0.283) (0.247) (0.364) 
    
Observations 
F-test 
10,883 
      8.47*** 
10,883 
   8.63*** 
10,883 
     8.57*** 
R-squared 0.036 0.036 0.036 
Number of banks 2,014 2,014 2,014 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES EFF EFF EFF EFF 
     
L.EFF 0.528*** 0.514*** 0.554*** 0.544*** 
 (0.0497) (0.0484) (0.0524) (0.0527) 
lnTA 0.0197** 0.0170* 0.0228** 0.0212** 
 (0.00952) (0.00910) (0.00919) (0.00916) 
EA 0.441*** 0.420*** 0.454*** 0.441*** 
 (0.117) (0.116) (0.108) (0.109) 
LA -0.0453 -0.0566 -0.00954 -0.0114 
 (0.0357) (0.0359) (0.0349) (0.0355) 
LLPL 0.113 0.0971 0.0158 0.0314 
 (0.128) (0.121) (0.114) (0.115) 
NIM -0.00834*** -0.00818*** -0.00897*** -0.00873*** 
 (0.00187) (0.00187) (0.00180) (0.00182) 
ROE 0.000793*** 0.000802*** 0.000801*** 0.000801*** 
 (0.000232) (0.000241) (0.000223) (0.000224) 
lnGDPcap -0.418*** -0.402*** -0.471*** -0.463*** 
 (0.0349) (0.0341) (0.0342) (0.0353) 
DCP 0.000155 0.000155 -0.000106 -0.000106 
 (0.000163) (0.000162) (0.000165) (0.000165) 
RL-WB 0.0346* 0.0455** 0.0301 0.0352* 
 (0.0203) (0.0202) (0.0190) (0.0193) 
lnTIME-CON 0.00545   0.00775 
 (0.0177)   (0.0172) 
COST-CON  0.00356**  0.00170 
  (0.00152)  (0.00155) 
lnPRO-CON   -0.463*** -0.452*** 
   (0.112) (0.119) 
Constant 4.329*** 4.179*** 6.463*** 6.283*** 
 (0.352) (0.303) (0.555) (0.634) 
     
Observations 8,871 8,871 8,871 8,871 
Number of banks 
N of instruments 
Wald 
AR2 p-value 
Hansen-J p-value 
1,897 
31 
   344.36*** 
0.1596 
0.475 
1,897 
31 
     342.59*** 
0.1577 
0.561 
1,897 
31 
 372.77*** 
0.2364 
0.414 
1,897 
33 
373.92*** 
0.2385 
0.775 
Note: The table reports the dynamic panel regression results for the enforcing contracts category of business regulation. The 
dependent variable (EFF) is the cost efficiency scores calculated using SFA and a assuming common frontier across 
countries. TA stands for total assets, EA is the equity to assets ratio, LLPL is the ratio of loan loss provision to total loans, 
LA stands for the loan to total assets ratio, NIM stands for net interest margin, ROE stands for return of equity, DCP stands 
for the ratio of domestic credit to the private sector over GDP, GDPcap is GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) 
constant 2005 international $, RL-WB stands for rule of law. TIME-CON: the time (in terms of days) to resolve a dispute, 
counted from the moment the plaintiff files the lawsuit in court until payment. This includes both the days when actions take 
place and the waiting periods between. COST-CON: the cost in court fees and attorney fees, where the use of attorneys is 
mandatory or common, expressed as a percentage of the debt value, PRO-CON: the average number of procedures to 
enforce a contract. The list of procedural steps compiled for each economy traces the chronology of a commercial dispute 
before the relevant court. To avoid collinearity problems with the selected variables, we first analyse correlations of all the 
selected variables. We observe that there is not a high level of correlation between the variables used in the models. ***, ** 
and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. Robust Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 13. Enforcing Contracts: Interactions with Institutional Quality 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
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VARIABLES eff eff eff eff eff eff 
       
L.eff 0.529*** 0.525*** 0.564*** 0.551*** 0.541*** 0.569*** 
 (0.0511) (0.0501) (0.0530) (0.0511) (0.0481) (0.0531) 
lnTA 0.0217** 0.0168* 0.0250*** 0.0229** 0.0186** 0.0244*** 
 (0.00961) (0.00933) (0.00919) (0.00989) (0.00917) (0.00945) 
EA 0.440*** 0.417*** 0.454*** 0.456*** 0.415*** 0.449*** 
 (0.116) (0.119) (0.106) (0.114) (0.112) (0.112) 
LA -0.0415 -0.0544 -0.00778 -0.0390 -0.0569 -0.0204 
 (0.0359) (0.0362) (0.0345) (0.0358) (0.0352) (0.0350) 
LLPL 0.0688 0.103 0.00710 0.0767 0.0739 -0.0102 
 (0.126) (0.128) (0.114) (0.136) (0.132) (0.116) 
NIM -0.00868*** -0.00785*** -0.00897*** -0.00910*** -0.00844*** -0.00942*** 
 (0.00185) (0.00188) (0.00179) (0.00203) (0.00210) (0.00184) 
ROE 0.000798*** 0.000747*** 0.000808*** 0.000767*** 0.000694*** 0.000767*** 
 (0.000232) (0.000218) (0.000219) (0.000234) (0.000230) (0.000222) 
lnGDPcap -0.424*** -0.410*** -0.458*** -0.419*** -0.363*** -0.459*** 
 (0.0355) (0.0345) (0.0338) (0.0394) (0.0338) (0.0324) 
DCP 0.000136 0.000154 -0.000115 0.000143 0.000211 -1.05e-05 
 (0.000166) (0.000162) (0.000164) (0.000168) (0.000158) (0.000167) 
RL-WB 0.0608 0.0623 -0.692**    
 (0.124) (0.0410) (0.351)    
lnTIME-CON 0.0130   -0.0564   
 (0.0368)   (0.0486)   
RL-WB*lnTIME-CON -0.00411      
 (0.0188)      
COST-CON  0.00383   0.00426  
  (0.00331)   (0.00264)  
RL-WB*COST-CON  -0.000751     
  (0.00188)     
lnPRO-CON   -0.693***   -0.653*** 
   (0.169)   (0.134) 
RL-WB*lnPRO-CON   0.206**    
   (0.100)    
COR-WB    -0.161 0.0371 -0.576** 
    (0.135) (0.0281) (0.227) 
COR-WB*lnTIME-CON    0.0296   
    (0.0217)   
COR-WB*COST-CON     0.000158  
     (0.00135)  
COR-WB*lnPRO-CON      0.171*** 
      (0.0654) 
Constant 4.325*** 4.248*** 7.108*** 4.684*** 3.719*** 6.990*** 
 (0.422) (0.308) (0.673) (0.589) (0.340) (0.638) 
       
Observations 8,871 8,871 8,871 8,871 8,871 8,871 
Number of banks 
N of instruments 
Wald 
AR2 p-value 
Hansen-J p-value 
1,897 
32 
      344.81*** 
0.1535 
0.491 
1,897 
32 
    347.28*** 
0.1850 
0.578 
1,897 
32 
392.03*** 
0.2252 
0.372 
1,897 
32 
     350.49*** 
0.1858 
0.486 
1,897 
32 
366.23*** 
0.2328 
0.187 
1,897 
32 
384.76*** 
0.2988 
0.327 
Note: The table reports the dynamic panel regression results for the enforcing contracts category of business regulation and 
their interaction with institutional quality. The dependent variable (EFF) is the cost efficiency scores calculated using SFA 
and assuming common frontier across countries. TA stands for total assets, EA is the equity to assets ratio,  LLPL is the ratio 
of loan loss provision to total loans, LA stands for the loan to total assets ratio, NIM stands for net interest margin, ROE 
stands for return of equity, DCP stands for the ratio of domestic credit to the private sector over GDP, GDPcap is GDP per 
capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) constant 2005 international $, RL-WB stands for rule of law, COR-WB stands for 
control of corruption. TIME-CON: the time (in terms of days) to resolve a dispute, counted from the moment the plaintiff 
files the lawsuit in court until payment. This includes both the days when actions take place and the waiting periods between. 
COST-CON: the cost in court fees and attorney fees, where the use of attorneys is mandatory or common, expressed as a 
percentage of the debt value, PRO-CON: the average number of procedures to enforce a contract. The list of procedural steps 
compiled for each economy traces the chronology of a commercial dispute before the relevant court. To avoid collinearity 
problems with the selected variables, we first analyse correlations of all the selected variables. We observe that there is not a 
high level of correlation between the variables used in the models. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance 
levels respectively. Robust Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
Table 14. Protecting Investors: Fixed Effects Panel Analysis 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES EFF EFF EFF EFF 
     
lnTA 0.0158* 0.0147* 0.0148* 0.0139 
 (0.00865) (0.00873) (0.00874) (0.00882) 
EA 0.0166 0.0135 0.0158 0.0115 
 (0.101) (0.101) (0.101) (0.101) 
LA 0.0632*** 0.0632*** 0.0621*** 0.0606** 
 (0.0238) (0.0239) (0.0239) (0.0239) 
LLPL 0.300*** 0.301*** 0.304*** 0.306*** 
 (0.113) (0.113) (0.109) (0.109) 
NIM -0.00167 -0.00160 -0.00146 -0.00153 
 (0.00210) (0.00211) (0.00211) (0.00210) 
ROE 0.000614*** 0.000620*** 0.000617*** 0.000627*** 
 (0.000174) (0.000176) (0.000173) (0.000175) 
lnGDPcap -0.342*** -0.341*** -0.372*** -0.360*** 
 (0.0410) (0.0410) (0.0431) (0.0434) 
DCP -0.000703*** -0.000760*** -0.000786*** -0.000760*** 
 (0.000153) (0.000151) (0.000151) (0.000153) 
RL-WB 0.00946 0.00727 -0.00458 0.00227 
 (0.0175) (0.0175) (0.0177) (0.0178) 
DISC-PI -0.00499***   -0.00445*** 
 (0.00134)   (0.00134) 
LIA-PI  0.0262***  0.0254*** 
  (0.00822)  (0.00823) 
SUI-PI   0.0495** 0.0470** 
   (0.0199) (0.0199) 
Constant 4.207*** 4.071*** 4.247*** 4.050*** 
 (0.420) (0.424) (0.422) (0.427) 
     
Observations 
F-test 
7,669 
13.50*** 
7,669 
12.39*** 
7,669 
 12.37*** 
7,669 
13.43*** 
R-squared 0.051 0.051 0.052 0.054 
Number of banks 1,867 1,867 1,867 1,867 
Note: The table reports the fixed-effects regression results for the protecting investors category of business regulation. The 
use of the fixed effects specification is justified after a Hausman test for each model. The dependent variable (EFF) is the 
cost efficiency scores calculated using SFA and assuming common frontier across countries. TA stands for total assets, EA 
is the equity to assets ratio,  LLPL is the ratio of loan loss provision to total loans, LA stands for the loan to total assets ratio, 
NIM stands for net interest margin, ROE stands for return of equity, DCP stands for the  ratio of domestic credit to the 
private sector over GDP, GDPcap is GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) constant 2005 international $, RL-WB 
stands for rule of law. DISC-PI: an index that measures the extent of disclosure, LIA-PI: an index that measures the extend 
of director liability, SUI-PI: an index that accounts for the shareholders’ ability to sue officers and directors for misconduct. 
To avoid collinearity problems with the selected variables, we first analyse correlations of all the selected variables. We 
observe that there is not a high level of correlation between the variables used in the models. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% 
and 10% significance levels respectively. Robust Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 15.  Protecting Investors: Dynamic Panel Analysis 
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Note: The table reports the dynamic panel regression results for the protecting investors category of business regulation. The 
dependent variable (EFF) is the cost efficiency scores calculated using SFA and assuming common frontier across countries. 
TA stands for total assets, EA is the equity to assets ratio,  LLPL is the ratio of loan loss provision to total loans, LA stands 
for the loan to total assets ratio, NIM stands for net interest margin, ROE stands for return of equity, DCP stands for the ratio 
of domestic credit to the private sector over GDP, GDPcap is GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) constant 
2005 international $, RL-WB stands for rule of law. DISC-PI: an index that measures the extent of disclosure, LIA-PI: an 
index that measures the extend of director liability, SUI-PI: an index that accounts for the shareholders’ ability to sue 
officers and directors for misconduct. To avoid collinearity problems with the selected variables, we first analyse 
correlations of all the selected variables. We observe that there is not a high level of correlation between the variables used 
in the models. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. Robust Standard errors are in 
parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 16.  Protecting Investors: Interactions with Institutional Quality. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES EFF EFF EFF EFF 
     
L.EFF 0.474*** 0.489*** 0.490*** 0.484*** 
 (0.0655) (0.0654) (0.0706) (0.0675) 
lnTA 0.0129 0.0196** 0.00599 0.0195* 
 (0.00899) (0.00963) (0.00953) (0.0101) 
EA 0.592*** 0.468*** 0.551*** 0.474*** 
 (0.164) (0.166) (0.169) (0.163) 
LA -0.0734** -0.0145 -0.0547 -0.0153 
 (0.0350) (0.0347) (0.0340) (0.0352) 
LLPL 0.220 0.0373 0.448*** 0.240 
 (0.160) (0.162) (0.151) (0.171) 
NIM -0.00669*** -0.00670*** -0.00462** -0.00524*** 
 (0.00188) (0.00192) (0.00184) (0.00196) 
ROE 0.000929*** 0.000918*** 0.000984*** 0.000994*** 
 (0.000284) (0.000290) (0.000283) (0.000296) 
lnGDPcap -0.439*** -0.511*** -0.453*** -0.509*** 
 (0.0377) (0.0425) (0.0373) (0.0429) 
DCP 0.000356* -1.03e-05 0.000308 -4.26e-05 
 (0.000208) (0.000188) (0.000196) (0.000198) 
RL-WB 0.0208 -0.0466* 0.0178 -0.0338 
 (0.0249) (0.0239) (0.0240) (0.0235) 
DISC-PI -0.00256   -0.000524 
 (0.00194)   (0.00192) 
LIA-PI  0.0940***  0.0929*** 
  (0.0181)  (0.0192) 
SUI-PI   -0.0397* 0.00129 
   (0.0231) (0.0303) 
Constant 4.739*** 5.043*** 5.172*** 5.005*** 
 (0.388) (0.394) (0.406) (0.389) 
     
Observations 7,359 7,359 7,359 7,359 
Number of banks 
N of instruments 
Wald 
AR2 p-value 
Hansen-J p-value 
1,824 
30 
    355.65*** 
0.1999 
0.417 
1,824 
30 
304.86*** 
0.1939 
0.406 
1,824 
30 
347.37*** 
0.2762 
0.693 
1,824 
32 
328.93*** 
0.2102 
0.516 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES eff eff eff eff eff eff 
       
L.eff 0.470*** 0.490*** 0.495*** 0.514*** 0.501*** 0.512*** 
 (0.0655) (0.0651) (0.0692) (0.0695) (0.0678) (0.0690) 
lnTA 0.0126 0.0187* 0.00647 0.0241** 0.0294*** 0.0204** 
 (0.00904) (0.00989) (0.00989) (0.00963) (0.00985) (0.00947) 
EA 0.575*** 0.471*** 0.545*** 0.654*** 0.583*** 0.590*** 
 (0.167) (0.168) (0.163) (0.165) (0.163) (0.158) 
LA -0.0755** -0.0164 -0.0492 -0.0532 -0.0132 -0.0476 
 (0.0350) (0.0354) (0.0352) (0.0335) (0.0343) (0.0335) 
LLPL 0.201 0.0208 0.429** 0.216 0.132 0.318* 
 (0.163) (0.159) (0.173) (0.168) (0.174) (0.188) 
NIM -0.00669*** -0.00679*** -0.00471** -0.00672*** -0.00677*** -0.00596*** 
 (0.00189) (0.00193) (0.00197) (0.00189) (0.00185) (0.00199) 
ROE 0.000954*** 0.000914*** 0.000954*** 0.000763*** 0.000839*** 0.000923*** 
 (0.000295) (0.000292) (0.000286) (0.000254) (0.000267) (0.000263) 
lnGDPcap -0.436*** -0.510*** -0.443*** -0.466*** -0.530*** -0.455*** 
 (0.0385) (0.0427) (0.0364) (0.0372) (0.0410) (0.0357) 
DCP 0.000363* -2.51e-05 0.000308 0.000361* 5.54e-05 0.000377** 
 (0.000212) (0.000186) (0.000194) (0.000219) (0.000189) (0.000181) 
RL-WB 0.0104 -0.00797 -0.0309    
 (0.0746) (0.0799) (0.134)    
DISC-PI -0.00502   0.0239   
 (0.0209)   (0.0161)   
RL-WB*DISC-PI 0.00115      
 (0.0112)      
LIA-PI  0.105***   0.0816***  
  (0.0253)   (0.0165)  
RL-WB*LIA-PI  -0.00827     
  (0.0161)     
SUI-PI   -0.0437   -0.00867 
   (0.0371)   (0.0327) 
RLWB*SUI-PI   0.00829    
   (0.0222)    
COR-WB    0.147*** 0.0989* 0.0332 
    (0.0423) (0.0548) (0.0978) 
COR-WB*DISC-PI    -0.0125*   
    (0.00711)   
COR-WB*LIA-PI     -0.00890  
     (0.0114)  
COR-WB*SUI-PI      0.00699 
      (0.0169) 
Constant 4.733*** 4.997*** 5.079*** 4.569*** 4.980*** 4.700*** 
 (0.388) (0.407) (0.452) (0.374) (0.385) (0.408) 
       
Observations 7,359 7,359 7,359 7,359 7,359 7,359 
Number of banks 
N of instruments 
Wald 
AR2 p-value 
Hansen-J p-value 
1,824 
31 
359.29*** 
0.1913 
0.331 
1,824 
31 
    310.11*** 
0.1973 
0.521 
1,824 
31 
359.08*** 
0.2625 
0.690 
1,824 
31 
390.97*** 
0.1772 
0.232 
1,824 
31 
361.20*** 
0.1682 
0.536 
1,824 
31 
371.46*** 
0.1981 
0.355 
Note: The table reports the dynamic panel regression results for the protecting investors category of business regulation and their interaction 
with institutional quality. The dependent variable (EFF) is the cost efficiency scores calculated using SFA and a assuming common frontier 
across countries. TA stands for total assets, EA is the equity to assets ratio,  LLPL is the ratio of loan loss provision to total loans, LA stands 
for the loan to total assets ratio, NIM stands for net interest margin, ROE stands for return of equity, DCP stands for the ratio of domestic 
credit to the private sector over GDP, GDPcap is GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) constant 2005 international $, RL-WB 
stands for rule of law. DISC-PI: an index that measures the extent of disclosure, LIA-PI: an index that measures the extend of director 
liability, SUI-PI: an index that accounts for the shareholders’ ability to sue officers and directors for misconduct. To avoid collinearity 
problems with the selected variables, we first analyse correlations of all the selected variables. We observe that there is not a high level of 
correlation between the variables used in the models. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. Robust 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 17.  Resolving Insolvency: Fixed Effects Panel Analysis. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES EFF EFF EFF EFF 
     
lnTA 0.0158** 0.0154** 0.0154** 0.0148** 
 (0.00729) (0.00728) (0.00727) (0.00728) 
EA 0.0121 0.0128 0.0161 0.00771 
 (0.0661) (0.0661) (0.0662) (0.0663) 
LA 0.0901*** 0.0937*** 0.0908*** 0.0897*** 
 (0.0211) (0.0213) (0.0211) (0.0212) 
LLPL 0.261*** 0.240*** 0.246*** 0.254*** 
 (0.0804) (0.0788) (0.0789) (0.0799) 
NIM -0.00625*** -0.00621*** -0.00634*** -0.00604*** 
 (0.00189) (0.00190) (0.00190) (0.00189) 
ROE 0.000501*** 0.000523*** 0.000517*** 0.000504*** 
 (0.000159) (0.000163) (0.000162) (0.000159) 
lnGDPcap -0.111*** -0.130*** -0.111*** -0.148*** 
 (0.0274) (0.0308) (0.0273) (0.0318) 
DCP -0.000301*** -0.000345*** -0.000370*** -0.000256** 
 (0.000101) (9.86e-05) (9.88e-05) (0.000103) 
RL-WB -0.0352** -0.0334** -0.0302* -0.0240 
 (0.0154) (0.0153) (0.0166) (0.0166) 
lnTIME-INS 0.0216***   0.0373*** 
 (0.00643)   (0.00783) 
COST-INS  0.00104***  0.00144*** 
  (0.000344)  (0.000368) 
REC-INS   1.24e-05 0.000754*** 
   (0.000223) (0.000266) 
Constant 1.793*** 1.992*** 1.800*** 2.093*** 
 (0.246) (0.284) (0.245) (0.289) 
     
Observations 
F-test 
10,883 
      10.20*** 
10,883 
     8.50*** 
10,883 
     8.47*** 
10,883 
9.16*** 
R-squared 0.037 0.036 0.035 0.040 
Number of banks 2,014 2,014 2,014 2,014 
Note: The table reports the fixed-effects regression results for the resolving insolvency category of business regulation. The 
use of the fixed effects specification is justified after a Hausman test for each model. The dependent variable (EFF) is the 
cost efficiency scores calculated using SFA and assuming common frontier across countries. TA stands for total assets, EA 
is the equity to assets ratio, LLP is the ratio of loan loss provision to total loans, LA stands for the loan to total assets ratio, 
NIM stands for net interest margin, ROE stands for return of equity, DCP stands for the  ratio of domestic credit to the 
private sector over GDP, GDPcap is GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) constant 2005 international $, RL-WB 
stands for rule of law. REC-INS: the recovery rate calculates how many cents on the dollar claimants (creditors, tax 
authorities, and employees) recover from an insolvent firm, COST-INS: the average cost of bankruptcy proceedings. The 
cost of the proceedings is recorded as a percentage of the estate’s value. TIME-INS: the average time (in terms of years) to 
close a business. Information is collected on the sequence of procedures and on whether any procedures can be carried out 
simultaneously. To avoid collinearity problems with the selected variables, we first analyse correlations of all the selected 
variables. We observe that there is not a high level of correlation between the variables used in the models. ***, ** and * 
indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. Robust Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 18.  Resolving Insolvency: Dynamic Panel Analysis. 
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Note: The table reports the dynamic panel regression results for the resolving insolvency category of business regulation. 
The dependent variable (EFF) is the cost efficiency scores calculated using SFA and assuming common frontier across 
countries. TA stands for total assets, EA is the equity to assets ratio, LLPL is the ratio of loan loss provision to total loans, 
LA stands for the loan to total assets ratio, NIM stands for net interest margin, ROE stands for return of equity, DCP stands 
for the ratio of domestic credit to the private sector over GDP, GDPcap is GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) 
constant 2005 international $, RL-WB stands for rule of law. REC-INS: the recovery rate calculates how many cents on the 
dollar claimants (creditors, tax authorities, and employees) recover from an insolvent firm, COST-INS: the average cost of 
bankruptcy proceedings. The cost of the proceedings is recorded as a percentage of the estate’s value. TIME-INS: the 
average time (in terms of years) to close a business. Information is collected on the sequence of procedures and on whether 
any procedures can be carried out simultaneously. To avoid collinearity problems with the selected variables, we first 
analyse correlations of all the selected variables. We observe that there is not a high level of correlation between the 
variables used in the models. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. Robust Standard 
errors are in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 19.  Resolving Insolvency: Interactions with Institutional Quality. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES EFF EFF EFF EFF 
     
L.EFF 0.522*** 0.513*** 0.531*** 0.524*** 
 (0.0489) (0.0514) (0.0490) (0.0537) 
lnTA 0.0198** 0.0157* 0.0152 0.0135 
 (0.00950) (0.00938) (0.00968) (0.00944) 
EA 0.435*** 0.419*** 0.398*** 0.409*** 
 (0.117) (0.119) (0.121) (0.120) 
LA -0.0489 -0.0581 -0.0472 -0.0409 
 (0.0354) (0.0358) (0.0354) (0.0354) 
LLPL 0.0955 0.0944 0.0946 0.0734 
 (0.124) (0.126) (0.120) (0.123) 
NIM -0.00841*** -0.00833*** -0.00822*** -0.00864*** 
 (0.00187) (0.00187) (0.00184) (0.00185) 
ROE 0.000754*** 0.000825*** 0.000791*** 0.000873*** 
 (0.000230) (0.000241) (0.000229) (0.000257) 
lnGDPcap -0.409*** -0.433*** -0.399*** -0.399*** 
 (0.0347) (0.0370) (0.0348) (0.0416) 
DCP 0.000246 0.000191 0.000269 0.000241 
 (0.000170) (0.000164) (0.000170) (0.000169) 
RL-WB 0.0312 0.0293 0.0320 0.0318 
 (0.0204) (0.0216) (0.0208) (0.0226) 
lnTIME-INS 0.0238***   -0.00841 
 (0.00760)   (0.0192) 
COST-INS  0.00117***  0.000368 
  (0.000386)  (0.000638) 
REC-INS   -0.00138*** -0.00176* 
   (0.000378) (0.000961) 
Constant 4.268*** 4.593*** 4.320*** 4.382*** 
 (0.303) (0.345) (0.302) (0.364) 
     
Observations 8,871 8,871 8,871 8,871 
Number of banks 
N of instruments 
Wald 
AR2 p-value 
Hansen-J p-value 
1,897 
32 
 440.42*** 
0.2176 
0.416 
1,897 
32 
412.21*** 
0.2136 
0.465 
1,897 
32 
434.70*** 
0.2459 
           0.446 
1,897 
34 
    452.74*** 
0.2360 
0.378 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
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Note: The table reports the dynamic panel regression results  for the resolving insolvency category of business regulation and their 
interaction with institutional quality. The dependent variable (EFF) is the cost efficiency scores calculated using SFA and assuming common 
frontier across countries. TA stands for total assets, EA is the equity to assets ratio, LLPL is  the ratio of loan loss provision to total loans, 
LA stands for the loan to total assets ratio, NIM stands for net interest margin, ROE stands for return of equity, DCP stands for the  ratio of 
domestic credit to the private sector over GDP, GDPcap is GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) constant 2005 international $, 
RL-WB stands for rule of law, COR-WB stands for control of corruption. REC-INS: the recovery rate calculates how many cents on the 
dollar claimants (creditors, tax authorities, and employees) recover from an insolvent firm, COST-INS: the average cost of bankruptcy 
proceedings. The cost of the proceedings is recorded as a percentage of the estate’s value. TIME-INS: the average time (in terms of years) to 
close a business. Information is collected on the sequence of procedures and on whether any procedures can be carried out simultaneously. 
To avoid collinearity problems with the selected variables, we first analyse correlations of all the selected variables. We observe that there is 
not a high level of correlation between the variables used in the models. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels 
respectively. Robust Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
Table 20: Employing Workers: Fixed Effects Panel Analysis. 
 
VARIABLES EFF EFF EFF EFF EFF EFF 
       
L.EFF 0.562*** 0.500*** 0.554*** 0.556*** 0.517*** 0.556*** 
 (0.0508) (0.0548) (0.0504) (0.0514) (0.0529) (0.0519) 
lnTA 0.0224** 0.0181* 0.0159* 0.0242*** 0.0178* 0.0194** 
 (0.00895) (0.00953) (0.00921) (0.00938) (0.00953) (0.00953) 
EA 0.393*** 0.428*** 0.366*** 0.405*** 0.416*** 0.389*** 
 (0.115) (0.119) (0.120) (0.121) (0.120) (0.123) 
LA -0.0473 -0.0518 -0.0518 -0.0471 -0.0583 -0.0450 
 (0.0334) (0.0366) (0.0335) (0.0335) (0.0356) (0.0334) 
LLPL -0.0112 0.0904 0.0688 -0.0269 0.0851 0.0658 
 (0.106) (0.132) (0.110) (0.113) (0.137) (0.121) 
NIM -0.00823*** -0.00831*** -0.00780*** -0.00891*** -0.00855*** -0.00853*** 
 (0.00181) (0.00185) (0.00180) (0.00188) (0.00204) (0.00190) 
ROE 0.000678*** 0.000820*** 0.000642*** 0.000619*** 0.000789*** 0.000583*** 
 (0.000224) (0.000237) (0.000208) (0.000226) (0.000243) (0.000212) 
lnGDPcap -0.429*** -0.441*** -0.427*** -0.429*** -0.426*** -0.421*** 
 (0.0335) (0.0389) (0.0333) (0.0332) (0.0401) (0.0353) 
DCP 0.000154 0.000133 0.000321** 0.000194 0.000249 0.000411** 
 (0.000162) (0.000166) (0.000162) (0.000166) (0.000167) (0.000167) 
RL-WB -0.0276 0.0593 0.188***    
 (0.0228) (0.0480) (0.0379)    
lnTIME-INS -0.172***   -0.132***   
 (0.0548)   (0.0454)   
RL-WB*lnTIME-INS 0.100***      
 (0.0275)      
COST-INS  0.00497   0.00520  
  (0.00471)   (0.00323)  
RL-WB*COST-INS  -0.00237     
  (0.00297)     
REC-INS   0.00225**   0.000830 
   (0.000879)   (0.000913) 
RL-WB*REC-INS   -0.00242***    
   (0.000497)    
COR-WB    -0.00293 0.0644*** 0.124*** 
    (0.0127) (0.0248) (0.0282) 
COR-WB*lnTIME-INS    0.0619***   
    (0.0180)   
COR-WB*COST-INS     -0.00166  
     (0.00170)  
COR-WB*REC-INS      -0.00131*** 
      (0.000397) 
Constant 4.536*** 4.599*** 4.362*** 4.477*** 4.410*** 4.304*** 
 (0.298) (0.381) (0.287) (0.316) (0.396) (0.301) 
       
Observations 8,871 8,871 8,871 8,871 8,871 8,871 
Number of banks 
N of instruments 
Wald 
AR2 p-value 
Hansen-J p-value 
1,897 
33 
      472.63*** 
0.2366 
0.607 
1,897 
33 
      412.74*** 
0.2075 
0.375 
1,897 
33 
  480.92*** 
0.3027 
0.644 
1,897 
33 
      415.00*** 
0.1871 
0.541   
1,897 
33 
   360.79*** 
0.1703 
0.506 
1,897 
33 
    409.16*** 
0.2377 
0.522 
 
51    
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES EFF EFF EFF EFF 
     
lnTA 0.0158 0.00963 0.00747 0.0108 
 (0.0138) (0.00986) (0.00978) (0.0178) 
EA 0.00437 -0.0498 -0.0547 -0.0668 
 (0.107) (0.118) (0.119) (0.132) 
LA 0.0312 0.0540** 0.0520* 0.00963 
 (0.0296) (0.0270) (0.0270) (0.0364) 
LLPL 0.416*** 0.254 0.249 0.460*** 
 (0.103) (0.156) (0.157) (0.115) 
NIM 0.00396 -0.00404** -0.00384** 0.000826 
 (0.00274) (0.00187) (0.00186) (0.00239) 
ROE 0.000586*** 0.000738*** 0.000736*** 0.000736*** 
 (0.000181) (0.000171) (0.000171) (0.000183) 
lnGDPcap -0.361*** -0.421*** -0.407*** -0.433*** 
 (0.0568) (0.0428) (0.0385) (0.0625) 
DCP -0.000820*** -0.000614*** -0.000626*** -0.000609** 
 (0.000240) (0.000156) (0.000156) (0.000259) 
RL-WB 0.0306 0.0115 0.00461 0.0559** 
 (0.0228) (0.0197) (0.0196) (0.0258) 
MW-EW 0.543***   0.669*** 
 (0.122)   (0.130) 
NOT-EW  -0.00155**  -0.00202*** 
  (0.000643)  (0.000726) 
SEV-EW   0.00510 0.00482 
   (0.00465) (0.00550) 
Constant 4.247*** 5.104*** 4.858*** 4.921*** 
 (0.650) (0.450) (0.423) (0.788) 
     
Observations 
F-test 
6,105 
      10.59*** 
6,294 
      13.38*** 
6,294 
      14.73*** 
4,730 
      11.62*** 
R-squared 0.063 0.073 0.073 0.082 
Number of banks 1,790 
 
1,843 
 
1,848 1,769 
 
Note: The table reports the fixed-effects regression results for the employing workers category of business regulation. The 
use of the fixed effects specification is justified after a Hausman test for each model. The dependent variable (EFF) is the 
cost efficiency scores calculated using SFA and assuming common frontier across countries. TA stands for total assets, EA 
is the equity to assets ratio,  LLPL is the ratio of loan loss provision to total loans, LA stands for the loan to total assets ratio, 
NIM stands for net interest margin, ROE stands for return of equity, DCP stands for the ratio of domestic credit to the 
private sector over GDP, GDPcap is GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) constant 2005 international $, RL-WB 
stands for rule of law. MW-EW: ratio of minimum wage to average wage, SP-EW: severance pay for redundancy dismissal 
after 20 years of continuous employment (in salary weeks), NOT-MW:  notice period for redundancy dismissal after 20 years 
of continuous employment (in salary weeks). To avoid collinearity problems with the selected variables, we first analyse 
correlations of all the selected variables. We observe that there is not a high level of correlation between the variables used 
in the models. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. Robust Standard errors are in 
parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 21.  Employing Workers: Dynamic Panel Analysis. 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES EFF EFF EFF EFF 
     
L.EFF 0.462*** 0.404*** 0.379*** 0.645*** 
 (0.0772) (0.0705) (0.0688) (0.136) 
lnTA 0.0279** 0.00458 -0.0119 0.0160 
 (0.0112) (0.0109) (0.0101) (0.0197) 
EA 0.633*** 0.311 0.292 0.398 
 (0.193) (0.206) (0.218) (0.273) 
LA -0.0704* -0.0456 -0.0831** -0.0893** 
 (0.0386) (0.0377) (0.0402) (0.0442) 
LLPL 0.259*** -0.139 0.184 0.379** 
 (0.0750) (0.250) (0.304) (0.161) 
NIM -0.00625** -0.00768*** -0.00568*** -0.00512* 
 (0.00244) (0.00195) (0.00207) (0.00279) 
ROE 0.000911*** 0.000930*** 0.00119*** 0.00105*** 
 (0.000306) (0.000272) (0.000271) (0.000315) 
lnGDPcap -0.450*** -0.581*** -0.514*** -0.702*** 
 (0.0510) (0.0417) (0.0430) (0.0688) 
DCP 0.000316 0.000258 0.000410** 0.000233 
 (0.000376) (0.000191) (0.000174) (0.000399) 
RL-WB -0.0507* 0.0169 0.0384 0.0740** 
 (0.0291) (0.0249) (0.0255) (0.0324) 
MW-EW 0.0309   0.908*** 
 (0.172)   (0.132) 
SEV-EW  0.00886***  0.00589** 
  (0.00208)  (0.00248) 
NOT-EW   0.000340 -0.00355*** 
   (0.000922) (0.000968) 
Constant 4.721*** 6.187*** 5.917*** 6.946*** 
 (0.532) (0.383) (0.428) (0.777) 
     
Observations 5,853 6,009 6,009 4,503 
Number of banks 
N of instruments 
Wald 
AR2 p-value 
Hansen-J p-value 
1,743 
27 
     290.38*** 
  0.3124 
0.528 
1,791 
24 
     362.35 *** 
0.0718 
0.499 
1,791 
24 
    374.77*** 
0.1284 
0.360 
1,705 
23 
   258.58*** 
0.0862 
0.358 
Note: The table reports the dynamic panel regression results for the employing workers category of business regulation. The 
dependent variable (EFF) is the cost efficiency scores calculated using SFA and assuming common frontier across countries. 
TA stands for total assets, EA is the equity to assets ratio, LLPL is the ratio of loan loss provision to total loans, LA stands 
for the loan to total assets ratio, NIM stands for net interest margin, ROE stands for return of equity, DCP stands for the ratio 
of domestic credit to the private sector over GDP, GDPcap is GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) constant 
2005 international $, RL-WB stands for rule of law. MW-EW: ratio of minimum wage to average wage, SP-EW: severance 
pay for redundancy dismissal after 20 years of continuous employment (in salary weeks), NOT-MW:   notice period for 
redundancy dismissal after 20 years of continuous employment (in salary weeks). To avoid collinearity problems with the 
selected variables, we first analyse correlations of all the selected variables. We observe that there is not a high level of 
correlation between the variables used in the models. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels 
respectively. Robust Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 22. Employing Workers: Interactions with Institutional Quality. 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES eff eff eff eff eff eff 
       
L.eff 0.465*** 0.379*** 0.389*** 0.502*** 0.439*** 0.452*** 
 (0.0777) (0.0682) (0.0734) (0.0767) (0.0735) (0.0764) 
lnTA 0.0199* 0.00897 0.00619 0.0241** 0.00792 0.0126 
 (0.0114) (0.0118) (0.0114) (0.0110) (0.0110) (0.0114) 
EA 0.525*** 0.467** 0.324 0.623*** 0.482** 0.389* 
 (0.195) (0.214) (0.211) (0.191) (0.238) (0.218) 
LA -0.0596 -0.0523 -0.0436 -0.0607 -0.0548 -0.0406 
 (0.0369) (0.0379) (0.0378) (0.0373) (0.0369) (0.0362) 
LLPL 0.243*** 0.125 -0.139 0.266*** 0.255 -0.108 
 (0.0789) (0.292) (0.253) (0.0846) (0.308) (0.264) 
NIM -0.00593** -0.00659*** -0.00766*** -0.00660*** -0.00623*** -0.00800*** 
 (0.00243) (0.00198) (0.00197) (0.00239) (0.00214) (0.00205) 
ROE 0.000980*** 0.00113*** 0.000924*** 0.000920*** 0.00106*** 0.000852*** 
 (0.000317) (0.000263) (0.000273) (0.000305) (0.000257) (0.000268) 
lnGDPcap -0.492*** -0.549*** -0.578*** -0.550*** -0.520*** -0.575*** 
 (0.0503) (0.0403) (0.0411) (0.0514) (0.0395) (0.0464) 
DCP 0.000113 0.000346** 0.000229 0.000233 0.000334* 0.000371* 
 (0.000370) (0.000172) (0.000198) (0.000345) (0.000202) (0.000206) 
RL-WB -0.130*** -0.0614* 0.00460    
 (0.0389) (0.0354) (0.0305)    
MW-EW -0.538*   -0.0703   
 (0.282)   (0.166)   
RL-WB*MW-EW 0.526***      
 (0.197)      
NOT-EW  -0.00333***   0.000646  
  (0.00123)   (0.000992)  
RL-WB*NOT-EW  0.00889***     
  (0.00261)     
SEV-EW   0.00734***   0.00800*** 
   (0.00228)   (0.00259) 
RL-WB*SEV-EW   0.00105    
   (0.00116)    
COR-WB    0.00775 0.0206 0.0377* 
    (0.0288) (0.0263) (0.0202) 
COR-WB*MW-EW    0.240**   
    (0.103)   
COR-WB*NOT-EW     0.00259*  
     (0.00150)  
COR-WB*SEV-EW      0.000233 
      (0.000823) 
Constant 5.395*** 5.947*** 6.164*** 5.664*** 5.578*** 5.935*** 
 (0.553) (0.399) (0.380) (0.526) (0.429) (0.449) 
       
Observations 5,853 6,009 6,009 5,853 6,009 6,009 
Number of banks 
N of instruments 
Wald 
AR2 p-value 
Hansen-J p-value 
1,743 
28 
     314.61*** 
0.489 
0.302 
1,791 
25 
 424.32*** 
0.0436 
0.320 
1,791 
25 
382.70*** 
0.1637 
0.256 
1,743 
28 
315.93*** 
0.3612 
0.287 
1,791 
25 
  448.14*** 
0.0772 
0.239 
1,791 
25 
414.65*** 
0.330 
0.316 
Note: The table reports the dynamic panel regression results for the employing workers category of business regulation and 
their interaction with institutional quality. The dependent variable (EFF) is the cost efficiency scores calculated using SFA 
and assuming common frontier across countries. TA stands for total assets, EA is the equity to assets ratio,  LLPL is the ratio 
of loan loss provision to total loans, LA stands for the loan to total assets ratio, NIM stands for net interest margin, ROE 
stands for return of equity, DCP stands for the ratio of domestic credit to the private sector over GDP, GDPcap is GDP per 
capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) constant 2005 international $, RL-WB stands for rule of law. MW-EW: ratio of 
minimum wage to average wage, SP-EW: severance pay for redundancy dismissal after 20 years of continuous employment 
(in salary weeks), NOT-MW:  notice period for redundancy dismissal after 20 years of continuous employment (in salary 
weeks). To avoid collinearity problems with the selected variables, we first analyse correlations of all the selected variables. 
We observe that there is not a high level of correlation between the variables used in the models. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 
5% and 10% significance levels respectively. Robust Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
Table 23.  Getting Credit:  Interactions with Crisis Dummy. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
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Note: The table reports the dynamic panel regression results for the getting credit category of business regulation and their interaction with 
the crisis dummy (CRISIS DUM). The CRISIS DUM variable takes a value of 1 for the years 2008 to 2010 and zero otherwise. The 
dependent variable (EFF) is the cost efficiency scores calculated using SFA and assuming common frontier across countries. TA stands for 
total assets, EA is the equity to assets ratio, LLPL is  the ratio of loan loss provision to total loans, LA stands for the loan to total assets ratio, 
NIM stands for net interest margin, ROE stands for return of equity, DCP stands for the ratio of domestic credit to the private sector over 
GDP, GDPcap is GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) constant 2005 international $, RL-WB stands for rule of law, COR-WB 
stands for control of corruption. LEG-CG:  this index measures the degree to which collateral and bankruptcy laws protect the rights of 
borrowers and lenders and thus facilitate lending, PB-CG: this indicator reports the number of individuals and firms listed in a public credit 
registry with information on their borrowing history from the past 5 years, PR-CG: this indicator reports the number of individuals and firms 
listed by a private credit bureau with information on their borrowing history from the past 5 years, DEPTH-CG: this index measures rules 
and practices affecting the coverage, scope and accessibility of credit information available through either a public credit registry or a 
private credit bureau. To avoid collinearity problems with the selected variables, we first analyse correlations of all the selected variables. 
We observe that there is not a high level of correlation between the variables used in the models. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance levels respectively. Robust Standard errors are in parentheses.   
 
 
   
VARIABLES EFF EFF EFF EFF 
     
L.EFF 0.519*** 0.462*** 0.541*** 0.540*** 
 (0.0526) (0.0545) (0.0575) (0.0581) 
lnTA 0.0200** 0.0321*** 0.0258*** 0.0215** 
 (0.00981) (0.00902) (0.00978) (0.00954) 
EA 0.432*** 0.466*** 0.504*** 0.495*** 
 (0.120) (0.106) (0.111) (0.114) 
LA -0.0342 -0.0349 -0.0510 -0.0381 
 (0.0344) (0.0349) (0.0358) (0.0357) 
LLPL 0.0529 0.0242 0.0362 0.0109 
 (0.122) (0.117) (0.126) (0.128) 
NIM -0.00869*** -0.00869*** -0.00940*** -0.00787*** 
 (0.00192) (0.00175) (0.00183) (0.00173) 
ROE 0.000653*** 0.000658*** 0.000694*** 0.000667** 
 (0.000239) (0.000242) (0.000260) (0.000271) 
lnGDPcap -0.382*** -0.435*** -0.415*** -0.435*** 
 (0.0377) (0.0364) (0.0413) (0.0475) 
DCP 0.000152 1.64e-05 0.000223 0.000178 
 (0.000167) (0.000169) (0.000169) (0.000177) 
RL-WB 0.0469** 0.0531*** 0.0338 0.0484** 
 (0.0218) (0.0205) (0.0226) (0.0223) 
LEG-CG -0.00987***    
 (0.00230)    
CRISIS DUM -0.0247** -0.0565*** 0.000816 -0.0224*** 
 (0.0103) (0.0163) (0.00284) (0.00707) 
LEG-CG*CRISIS DUM 0.00318**    
 (0.00142)    
DEPTH-CG  0.0152***   
  (0.00419)   
DEPTH-CG*CRISIS DUM  0.0103***   
  (0.00292)   
PB-CG   -0.000754  
   (0.000695)  
PB-CG*CRISIS DUM   -0.000263  
   (0.000262)  
PV-CG    0.000107 
    (0.000312) 
PV-CG*CRISIS DUM    0.000305*** 
    (7.54e-05) 
Constant 4.045*** 4.331*** 4.238*** 4.471*** 
 (0.321) (0.319) (0.350) (0.416) 
     
Observations 8,871 8,871 8,675 8,648 
Number of banks 
N of instruments 
Wald 
AR2 p-value 
Hansen-J p-value 
1,897 
33 
     398.22*** 
0.1085 
0.317 
1,897 
33 
      421.57*** 
0.1683 
0.2622 
1,886 
33 
    340.49*** 
0.2718 
0.553 
1,881 
33 
382.32*** 
0.3141 
0.432 
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Table 24.  Protecting Investors: Interactions with Crisis Dummy. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES EFF EFF EFF 
    
L.EFF 0.441*** 0.421*** 0.482*** 
 (0.0705) (0.0717) (0.0777) 
lnTA 0.0167* 0.0280*** 0.00825 
 (0.00884) (0.0102) (0.00944) 
EA 0.590*** 0.482*** 0.515*** 
 (0.160) (0.159) (0.168) 
LA -0.0624* 0.00311 -0.0446 
 (0.0351) (0.0351) (0.0338) 
LLPL 0.187 0.0430 0.432*** 
 (0.159) (0.159) (0.154) 
NIM -0.00710*** -0.00706*** -0.00454** 
 (0.00183) (0.00184) (0.00181) 
ROE 0.000751*** 0.000720*** 0.000816*** 
 (0.000276) (0.000279) (0.000276) 
lnGDPcap -0.428*** -0.497*** -0.442*** 
 (0.0386) (0.0440) (0.0381) 
DCP 0.000398* -5.73e-05 0.000418** 
 (0.000222) (0.000203) (0.000209) 
RL-WB 0.00911 -0.0437* 0.0176 
 (0.0275) (0.0260) (0.0266) 
CRISIS-DUM -0.0158* -0.0396*** 0.0106 
 (0.00934) (0.00990) (0.0174) 
DISC-PI -0.00215   
 (0.00194)   
CRISIS-DUM*DISC-PI 0.00178   
 (0.00159)   
LIA-PI  0.0822***  
  (0.0174)  
CRISIS-DUM*LIA-PI  0.00732***  
  (0.00205)  
SUI-PI   -0.0369 
   (0.0231) 
CRISIS-DUM*SUI-PI   -0.00266 
   (0.00296) 
Constant 4.597*** 4.883*** 5.005*** 
 (0.387) (0.401) (0.413) 
    
Observations 7,359 7,359 7,359 
Number of banks 
N of instruments 
Wald 
AR2 p-value 
Hansen-J p-value 
1,824 
32 
    430.45*** 
0.2163 
0.341 
1,824 
32 
    357.37*** 
0.1404 
0.126 
1,824 
32 
     402.73*** 
0.2013 
0.448 
Note: The table reports the dynamic panel regression results for the protecting investors  category of business regulation and their 
interaction with the crisis dummy (CRISIS DUM). The CRISIS DUM variable takes a value of 1 for the years 2008 to 2010 and zero 
otherwise. The dependent variable (EFF) is the cost efficiency scores calculated using SFA and assuming common frontier across countries. 
TA stands for total assets, EA is the equity to assets ratio,  LLPL is the ratio of loan loss provision to total loans, LA stands for the loan to 
total assets ratio, NIM stands for net interest margin, ROE stands for return of equity, DCP stands for the ratio of domestic credit to the 
private sector over GDP, GDPcap is GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) constant 2005 international $, RL-WB stands for rule 
of law. DISC-PI: an index that measures the extent of disclosure, LIA-PI: an index that measures the extend of director liability, SUI-PI: an 
index that accounts for the shareholders’ ability to sue officers and directors for misconduct. To avoid collinearity problems with the 
selected variables, we first analyse correlations of all the selected variables. We observe that there is not a high level of correlation between 
the variables used in the models. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. Robust Standard errors are in 
parentheses.  
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APPENDIX 
 Table A1: Cost Function following Battese and Coelli (1995)  
  Coefficient Standard         Errors t-ratio 
lnP1 0.448 0.031 14.24 
lnP2 0.308 0.026 11.67 
lnY1 0.622 0.02 31.24 
lnY2 0.552 0.017 32.753 
lnN1 0.079 0.014 5.78 
lnN2 -0.218 0.026 -8.252 
(lnP1)2 0.135 0.005 29.484 
(lnP2)2 -0.066 0.003 -19.197 
(lnP1)(lnP2) -0.102 0.007 -13.997 
(lnY1)2 0.114 0.002 70.281 
(lnY2)2 0.121 0.002 70.725 
(lnY1)(lnY2) -0.312 0.005 -62.475 
(lnP1)(lnY1) -0.04 0.003 -15.16 
(lnP2)(lnY1) 0.01 0.002 3.921 
(lnP1)(lnY2) -0.02 0.003 -6.832 
(lnP2)(lnY2) 0.005 0.003 1.906 
(lnN1)2 0.009 0.002 4.922 
(lnN2)2 -0.057 0.006 -10.049 
(lnN1)(lnN2) -0.023 0.004 -5.126 
(lnN1)(lnY1) 0.002 0.002 1.299 
(lnN1)(lnY2) -0.005 0.001 -3.443 
(lnN1)(lnP1) -0.005 0.002 -2.225 
(lnN1)(lnP2) 0.018 0.002 8.323 
(lnN2)(lnY1) 0.036 0.003 10.349 
(lnN2)(lnY2) 0.039 0.003 12.881 
(lnN2)(lnP1) 0.077 0.005 15.648 
(lnN2)(lnP2) -0.025 0.005 -5.146 
t 0.027 0.009 3.053 
(t)2 -0.008 0.001 -6.952 
t(lnP1) 0.005 0.002 2.915 
t(lnP2) 0.008 0.002 4.24 
t(lnY1) 0.001 0.001 0.639 
t(lnY2) -0.007 0.001 -6.194 
t(lnN1) 0.002 0.001 1.713 
t(lnN2) 0.005 0.001 3.695 
constant -3.029 0.093 -32.701 
Z variables affecting cost inefficiency 
C5 -0.013 0.002 -7.264 
GDPgr -0.01 0.003 -3.798 
INFL 0.025 0.005 4.553 
Lerner -0.702 0.038 -18.482 
Country Dummies                                                             yes
Number of observations 11428 
Log likelihood 4665.24 
 
Notes: The table depicts the estimations of the cost efficiency frontier and the correlates of bank cost inefficiencies using the Battese and Coelli (1995) model. 
P1 and  P2  stand for the input prices of labour and physical capital  Y1 and Y2 stand for the outputs of loans and other earning assets respectively, N1 and N2 are 
the fixed netputs of fixed assets and equity.  As environmental (Z) variables that could affect inefficiency we employ the five banks concentration ratio (C5), 
GDP growth (GDPgr), the Lerner index at the country level as a measure of bank competition (Lerner) and the inflation rate (INFL). We also impose country 
dummies.  
